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Procedural due process has the comfortable feel of an old, familiar legal
doctrine.' If defining the substantive standards imposed by due process can
seem challenging, 2  procedural due process seems straightforward by
comparison: a person may not constitutionally be deprived of "life, liberty or
property" by governmental action without notice and a meaningful opportunity
to be heard.3 These core procedural rules seem indisputable. In the American
adversary tradition, after all, it is commonly said that "no better instrument has
been devised for arriving at truth" than a contest between parties, presided over
by a neutral arbiter.4 And yet, in criminal proceedings, even procedural due
process is not quite so simple. In particular, this Article explores an anomalous
divergence between civil and criminal due process rules, under which key
notice-and-hearing rights that must be granted to civil litigants are not
constitutionally required for criminal defendants in the pretrial stages of a
criminal case, even if both are threatened with comparable losses.
5
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that no person shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law"); id. amend. XIV (providing that no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law"). The principle that "due process of law" requires the
government to follow certain procedures in order to implement even valid actions against individuals
has a long-standing pedigree. See, e.g., Edward Eberle. Procedural Due Process: The Original
Understanding, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 339, 339 (1987) ("By 1868, due process had come to connote a
certain core procedural fairness when government moved against a citizen's life, liberty, or property.").
2. Much constitutional litigation, and academic debate, has raged over the substantive limits that
due process imposes on governmental action-about the actions that a civilized government may not
take, regardless of the fairness of procedures followed. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. v. Campbell,
538 U.S. 408 (2003) (discussing limits on punitive damages); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739
(1987) (discussing permissible rationales for civil detention); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(discussing the area of personal privacy); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (discussing the
limits on coercive investigative techniques). This Article focuses instead on modem application of the
traditional due process doctrine that certain procedural hearing rights must accompany permissible
governmental action against individuals. Even in this area, however, as explored in this Article, due
process is not free from controversy.
3. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) ("Many
controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can
be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication
be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case."); see also
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) (to same effect); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80
(1972) (noting that the "central meaning of procedural due process" is the "right to notice and an
opportunity to be heard ... at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner"). See generally Martin H.
Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due
Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 475 (1986) ("The Supreme Court has often stated that the core rights of due
process are notice and hearing.").
4. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a
person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it."). Justice
Frankfurter's famous comment on the value of the adversary process has been repeated often in the
Court's due process decisions. See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 55
(1993) (quoting McGrath, 341 U.S. at 171-72 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); Connecticut v. Doehr, 501
U.S. 1, 12-14 (1991) (same); Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 81 (same).
5. Compare, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485-89 (1972) (holding that due process
requires a preliminary adversary hearing to support the pretrial detention of a convicted felon in a civil
parole revocation proceeding), with Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27 (1975) (holding that due
process does not require an adversary hearing to support the pretrial detention of a criminal defendant).
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The conventional doctrine of procedural due process, applied in civil
settings from low-level agency hearings to full-scale civil trials, grants a right
to notice and a hearing whenever government action threatens a loss.6 This
conception of procedural due process is familiar to a first-year law student:7 a
citizen faced with a governmental deprivation of a liberty or property interest
has a due process right to "some kind of hearing."8 While the case often cited
for this doctrine is the modem precedent of Mathews v. Eldridge,9 the idea that
the essential character of procedural due process is a right to notice and a
hearing has deeper roots.'
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In criminal cases, however, there are respects in which procedural due
process can apply quite differently. It may surprise those not steeped in the
intricacies of criminal procedure to learn that hearing rights constitutionally
required for individuals threatened with adverse government action in civil
settings are not necessarily enjoyed by criminal defendants." In particular,
while the criminal trial, when it occurs, is the pinnacle of constitutional
"process, ' ' 12  it has long been recognized that criminal defendants
6. See Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 80 (noting that the "central meaning of procedural due process" is the
"right to notice and an opportunity to be heard.., at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner");
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (holding that suspending a driver's license requires prior "notice
and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case"); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
377 (1971) (holding that indigent divorce litigants "forced to settle their claims of right and duty through
the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard"). Compare, e.g., Baldwin v.
Hale, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 223, 233 (1864) (recognizing a due process right to notice and hearing prior to a
court's adjudication of property rights), with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (recognizing a
due process right to notice and hearing prior to an administrative agency's termination of welfare
benefits). See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (establishing a three-part test to
determine the process due when government action threatens liberty or property).
7. See, e.g., Stephen C. Yeazell, CIvIL PROCEDURE 324-25 (6th ed. 2004) (stating that the
fundamental requirement of due process is an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner).
8. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974) ("The Court has consistently held that
some kind of hearing is required at some time before a person is finally deprived of his property
interests."); see generally Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1270-75
(1975) (discussing the Supreme Court's development and elaboration of the due process hearing
requirement).
9. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); see, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 32
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 8129 (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE] (describing Mathews as "the cornerstone for all analysis of procedural adequacy").
10. See, e.g., 32 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 9, § 8126 (observing that while the
Supreme Court's seminal due process cases issued in the 1970's reflected "increased interest in that
guarantee, the current law traces its origins back well beyond that era"); Eberle, supra note 1, at 362
(describing nineteenth-century judicial decisions that read due process to require notice, an opportunity
to be heard, and a determination by a neutral decision-maker).
11. Knowledgeable commentators have remarked on the lack of basic due process protections in
the pretrial stages of criminal cases. See, e.g., 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 14.2(a) (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] (noting that the Supreme Court's "brusque
rejection of a possible constitutional requirement of judicial screening for a charge which has not
otherwise been screened by a neutral body... may seem surprising in light of the growth in due
process"). Yet there has been surprisingly little attention paid to this doctrinal anomaly.
12. See Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme
Court's Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303, 391 (2001) ("[A] wide variety of
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constitutionally may be arrested, detained, and suspended from government
employment before trial with less meaningful hearing rights than comparable
deprivations would require in civil litigation.13 Justice Stewart may best be
known for his memorable quote on the difficulty of defining obscenity, 4 but he
also originated a pithy observation with respect to procedural due process when
he complained that under the Court's different due process rules governing the
pretrial process in civil and criminal matters, "the Constitution extends less
procedural protection to an imprisoned human being than is required to test the
propriety of garnishing a commercial bank account, . . . the custody of a
refrigerator, . . . the temporary suspension of a public school student, or the
suspension of a driver's license."
' 15
The bedrock principle that trial must precede judgment is, of course,
applied to civil and criminal cases alike. 16 But in civil and administrative
matters, this doctrine is also logically extended to every stage of the litigation
process: as a matter of due process, for example, an appropriately tailored
hearing must precede the issuance of a preliminary injunction, no less than the
entry of a final civil judgment, because of the concern for the accuracy of both
decisions-and the recognition that distinct harms to the individual may flow
from each. 17
In criminal cases, by contrast, there is no constitutional requirement that the
defendant be permitted to test the factual basis for the government's charges
prior to the criminal trial, even when those criminal charges are used to justify
imposing restrictions on the defendant's liberty or property pending trial. 18
due process limitations add considerably to the constitutional regulation of the [criminal] trial."); see
also infra notes 94-103 and accompanying text (describing procedural protections constitutionally
required at criminal trial).
13. See infra Section lI.B.
14. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (commenting, with
respect to hard-core pornography, that "I know it when I see it").
15. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 127 (1975) (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Justice Stewart's observation in this regard was pointed but accurate. Compare, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972) (holding that notice and hearing must precede temporary seizure of household
goods in civil litigation), with Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 123 (holding that notice and hearing are not required
for pretrial detention of defendant in criminal litigation).
16. See, e.g., Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948) ("No principle of procedural due process
is more clearly established than that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of
the issues raised by that charge, if desired, are among the constitutional rights of every accused in a
criminal proceeding in all courts, state or federal."); Chaloner v. Sherman, 242 U.S. 455, 461 (1917)
(stating that the "essential elements of due process of law were fully met" in a civil proceeding to
appoint a trustee when the "plaintiff had notice and opportunity to be heard at each stage of these
proceedings").
17. See, e.g., Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 96-97 (noting that the court may issue an order, upon a creditor's
motion, to seize property prior to final judgment only when the "creditors have tested their claim to the
goods through the process of a fair prior hearing"); Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft
Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding that a preliminary injunction hearing satisfied the
due process requirements enunciated in Fuentes).
18. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143 (1979) (stating that "an adversary hearing is not
required" to support the pretrial detention of a criminal defendant); Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 123 (noting
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Courts have not merely refused to grant due process hearing rights in the
criminal pretrial process, 19 but have affirmatively held that the grand jury's
secret, one-sided indictment decision approving a prosecutor's criminal charges
conclusively establishes that the criminal charges are supported by evidence.
20
The net result of these doctrines is that the main procedural event in a criminal
case, from a due process perspective, is the criminal trial. 2 1 The preliminary
steps that occur prior to trial in a criminal case-arraignment, bail hearings and
so on-are largely administrative steps designed to bring the defendant to trial,
not meaningful adversary proceedings designed to review and test the
government's evidence.22  Instead, the criminal defendant's primary
constitutional protection with respect to the harms he may suffer in the pretrial
criminal process is to insist on a (relatively) speedy trial.2 3
Unresolved tension between the Supreme Court's procedural due process
doctrines in civil and criminal matters emerged, most recently, in constitutional
litigation over the due process rights of enemy combatants. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
was the "perfect storm" for divergent due process rules because it involved a
basic dispute over whether the government could use civil processes to detain
citizens accused of acting as "enemy combatants," or whether it must resort to
the criminal process and obtain a conviction in order to imprison such
24persons. Because both civil and criminal avenues were possible, the case
required the Court to consider how due process might apply differently in each
setting. Treating detention of enemy combatants as a permissible form of civil
that "the Constitution does not require an adversary determination of probable cause" to support the
pretrial detention of criminal defendant); Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 590 (1913) (noting that
due process does not require an adversary judicial hearing at the outset of a criminal prosecution).
19. See generally 4 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 11, § 14.2(a) (stating that despite the
"burdens of accusation and litigation imposed upon a criminal defendant," the Supreme Court has held
in some cases that "due process provides no procedural protection" for the defendant's interests in
avoiding pretrial restraints).
20. In a criminal case, grand jury indictment alone suffices to establish conclusively that probable
cause exists to believe that the defendant committed the crimes charged. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103, 118 n. 19 (1975) (stating that a grand jury indictment "conclusively determines the existence of
probable cause" (quoting Exparte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 250 (1932))).
21. See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing
To Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REV. 463, 468 (1979) (observing that "our
criminal justice system relies primarily on the trial as the appropriate occasion to vindicate" individual
rights and to prevent conviction without adjudication).
22. See, e.g., Baker, 443 U.S. at 145 (noting that the primary constitutional protections in the
pretrial process consist of "requirements that arrest be made only on probable cause and that one
detained be accorded a speedy trial").
23. Id. Defendants may wait many months, or even years, for a criminal trial without their
prosecution violating the constitutional speedy trial guarantee. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,
533-35 (1972) (upholding as constitutional a delay of over five years from arrest to criminal trial).
24. 542 U.S. 507 (2004); compare id. at 518 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (treating the
executive detention of enemy combatants as a valid "protective custody" measure), with id. at 556
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (distinguishing the detention of citizens as enemy combatants from permissible
"non criminal detention" such as civil commitment of mentally ill).
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detention, 25 a majority of the Justices applied traditional procedural due process
doctrine to require notice and a hearing to test the factual basis for detention.26
Even in this setting of heightened concern over national security and terrorism,
the Court reaffirmed the basic tenets of procedural due process, holding that the
government must extend to citizen detainees the core due process rights to
notice and a hearing.
This much of the decision treads familiar ground, because it applies the
familiar approach that immediately comes to mind when we think about
procedural due process. What is more puzzling is the due process approach
advocated by Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, who took the view that
the government's claims against Yaser Esam Hamdi must proceed criminally.27
Hinting at a constitutional dispute that has periodically emerged in Supreme
Court precedents, these Justices argued that the Mathews decision, which
reflects the conventional notice-and-hearing test for procedural due process, is
inapplicable in criminal settings.28 Instead, they argued, a criminal defendant's
due process rights consist of those traditional rights historically afforded to
defendants in the criminal process. 29 This is a distinctly different vision of
procedural due process.
While Hamdi does not concern the criminal pretrial process-the focus of
this Article-the competing due process approaches in that case aptly
symbolize the Supreme Court's divergent approaches to procedural due process
in criminal and civil litigation, which may differ in the hearing rights granted
even when the interests at stakes seem quite similar. Civil due process
doctrine is consistent but flexible-some kind of hearing must be extended
25. See id. at 519 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (emphasizing that detention of enemy
combatants is permissible because it is nonpunitive).
26. Id. at 509 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy and Breyer,
J.J.) ("[D]ue process demands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a
meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker.");
see also id. at 553 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Ginsburg, J.) ("[S]omeone in
Hamdi's position is entitled at a minimum to notice of the Government's claimed factual basis for
holding him, and to a fair chance to rebut it before a neutral decision maker.").
27. Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("When the Government accuses a citizen of waging war
against it, our constitutional tradition has been to prosecute him in federal court for treason or some
other crime.").
28. See id. at 576 (arguing that Mathews has no application to due process inquiries when "the
Constitution and the common law already supply an answer").
29. See id. at 556 ("The gist of the Due Process Clause, as understood at the founding and since,
was to force the Government to follow those common-law procedures traditionally deemed necessary
before depriving a person of life, liberty or property. When a citizen was deprived of liberty because of
alleged criminal conduct, those procedures typically required committal by a magistrate followed by
indictment and trial.").
30. By comparison with the vast gap between the procedural rights the plurality and the dissent
would extend to Hamdi, the harms he suffers by virtue of his detention are far closer in nature. See, e.g.,
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530 (1975) ("Regardless of the purposes for which the incarceration is
imposed, the fact remains that it is incarceration."); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967) ("[C]ommitment
is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against one's will, whether it is called criminal' or 'civil."').
Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process
whenever a deprivation is threatened, but the contours of that hearing can vary
quite significantly. 31 Criminal due process doctrine, by comparison, can seem
rigid and uneven. At a criminal trial, if it occurs, not only will the factual basis
for the government's criminal charges be fully aired, but the government will
bear a heavy burden to establish that the facts are as it contends. 32 Before a
criminal trial, however-at the time when the defendant is presumptively
innocent-the defendant lacks certain basic due process hearing rights.
33
While this debate provides a contradiction rich in issues, the particular
focus of this Article is on the criminal model of procedural due process invoked
by Justice Scalia.34 In particular, the Article considers whether the Court's
distinctive approach to criminal cases, insofar as it rejects the application of
conventional notice-and-hearing principles to pretrial criminal litigation, can be
justified on the rationales offered. In Part I, the Article outlines the
conventional model of due process in civil settings, exemplified by Justice
O'Connor's Hamdi opinion, with its premise that notice and a hearing should
precede liberty or property deprivations. In Part II, the Article turns to the very
different model of procedural due process in criminal litigation, symbolized by
Justice Scalia's Hamdi dissent, which combines minimal pretrial procedures
with extensive protections at a criminal trial. In Part III, the Article considers
the problematic consequences of allowing two distinct approaches to
procedural due process to coexist, one applicable to civil settings and the other
to criminal matters, without conceptually integrating the two doctrines. Finally,
in Part IV, the Article turns to the explanations offered by the Supreme Court to
justify tolerating different analytical approaches to procedural due process in
civil and criminal matters. Rejecting these as insufficient, the Article argues for
a rational, integrated model of criminal and civil due process, and considers
how this might change the criminal pretrial process.
31. See supra note 8.
32. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (holding that the "reasonable-doubt standard" is
the burden of proof constitutionally required at a criminal trial).
33. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143 (1979) (emphasizing that "an adversary hearing is
not required" to support the pretrial detention of a criminal defendant); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 697-98 (1977) (noting that the Supreme Court has "rejected the argument that procedural
protections required in [the Court's civil] due process cases should be afforded to a criminal suspect
arrested without a warrant"); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27 (1975) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment's nonadversary review procedures define the only 'process that is due' for seizures of
person or property in criminal cases, including the detention of suspects pending trial"); Lem Woon v.
Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 590 (1913) (holding that due process does not require an adversary judicial
hearing at outset of criminal prosecution). See generally 4 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 11,
§ 14.2(a) (noting that some Supreme Court cases have discussed how "due process provides no
procedural protection" for the defendant's interests in avoiding pretrial restraints).
34. While this Article focuses on respects in which applying standard notice-and-hearing rights
could usefully improve criminal adjudication, an equally interesting approach would look at the opposite
side of the analytical gap--how the superior rights afforded at a criminal trial might usefully inform the
comparatively minimalist procedures approved in civil cases like Hamdi. Whether Justice O'Connor's
civil due process model may be unduly flexible presents a valid and interesting question, but is largely
beyond the scope of the present Article. See infra Section IV.B.
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I. THE CONTOURS OF CIVIL DUE PROCESS
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment simply states that no
person shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." 35 This short phrase has, of course, been the subject of extensive
interpretation and debate. While an early school argued that "due process of
law" simply requires the government to proceed based on established rules
announced in advance, 36 the Supreme Court long ago rejected this limited
view.37 Instead, the Court has read the cryptic phrase "due process of law" to
impose certain requirements, both substantive and, more often, procedural in
nature.38 This Article focuses on the latter.
Briefly stated, the essential element of procedural due process, as clearly
established in civil settings, is that notice and a hearing must ordinarily precede
any governmental deprivation of a liberty or property interest. 39 "Civil due
process" is the shorthand this Article uses to describe this constitutional test.
The understanding that due process requires "some kind of hearing" to test the
basis for adverse government action is not, of course, limited to civil settings.4 °
The very premise of a criminal trial is that a defendant should not be
condemned without notice and an opportunity to be heard,4 while the core
principle that due process grants notice-and-hearing rights has also been
articulated in the Court's criminal precedents.42 Nonetheless, it is useful to refer
35. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
36. See Israel, supra note 12, at 311 (stating that as generally understood by English courts and
writers, due process simply prohibited the imposition of sanctions upon an individual except by jury
verdict or "alternative procedures clearly established in the standing law (i.e., the law of the land)").
37. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528 (1884) ("[D]ue process of law must mean
something more than the actual existing law of the land .... ).
38. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (stating that the Due Process Clause
"protects individuals against two types of government action" through substantive due process and
procedural due process doctrines); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 170, 208 (1952) (describing the Due
Process Clause as "the least specific and most comprehensive protection of liberties").
39. See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Bank & Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) ("Many
controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can
be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication
be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.").
40. See generally Friendly, supra note 8, at 1267-68.
41. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171 n.17 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (describing as an established principle of "natural justice" the proposition
that "[n]o party ought to be condemned unheard" (citation omitted)); Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.)
223, 233 (1864) ("Common justice requires that no man shall be condemned in his person or property
without notice and an opportunity to make his defence.").
42. See, e.g., Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690-91 (1986) (explaining that due process entitles
a defendant to a "meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense" at his criminal trial, because
"an essential component of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard" (citation omitted));
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984) (explaining that through the Due Process Clause and
other provisions, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants "a meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense"); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (explaining that due process requires that a
criminal defendant be given "reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard
in his defense").
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to the notice-and-hearing model as a "civil" model of due process because it is
in civil settings that this test is clearly established as the single constitutional
approach to procedural due process. When a majority of Justices in Hamdi
agreed on the core requirements of procedural due process, for example, they
applied a classic civil formulation-the right to notice and an opportunity to be
heard before an impartial adjudicator-as the correct constitutional approach to
due process even for the executive detention of enemy combatants, a new and
controversial civil setting.
43
The case often used to express the civil model of due process is Mathews v.
Eldridge. 4 In Mathews, which concerned an agency proceeding to terminate
disability benefits, the Supreme Court affirmed that the "right to be heard
before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind" is a basic
constitutional principle.4 5 In so holding, the Court applied a principle reflected
in numerous prior and subsequent Supreme Court decisions. 46 The Court went
on, in Mathews, to articulate the now familiar three-part test used to determine
the particular hearing procedures due in a given setting, which balances the
private interests at stake, the risk of error and value of additional procedures,
and the interests of the government. 47 The Mathews model is sometimes
described as a modem due process model, and some would limit its relevance
to modem administrative settings. 48 Yet the core Mathews holding-that the
43. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) ("An essential principle of due process is
that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case." (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542
(1985)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
44. 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see 32 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 9, § 8129 (noting
that the Mathews analysis has "guided due process analysis ever since" it was issued).
45. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (quoting McGrath, 341 U.S. at 168 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
46. A classic formulation of this notice-and-hearing principle is found in the Supreme Court's
decision in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). There, the Court emphasized that "[flor more than a
century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: 'Parties whose rights are to be
affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified."'
Id. at 80 (quoting Baldwin, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) at 233 (1864)); see also Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal.,
Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993); Ward v. Monroeville, 409
U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
47. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333. The three-part Mathews test provides that for any cognizable
deprivation of liberty or property, the procedures constitutionally due are determined by considering:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335; see also Hamndi, 524 U.S. at 529 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (applying the three-part
Mathews test). The Court has characterized the Mathews test as its "general approach" for testing the
sufficiency of procedures challenged under due process. See, e.g., Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584, 599
(1979).
48. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 575-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Mathews line of
cases is limited to "newly recognized property rights"). One might validly argue that the three-part test
articulated in Mathews can be unduly flexible. In the pretrial stage of criminal cases, however, it is not
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opportunity to be heard is the essence of due process protection-is
uncontroversial, at least in civil settings.
At heart, the notice-and-hearing approach to due process reflected in such
decisions is simply an expression of basic values of the American adversary
system of justice.49 The notion is simple. If each person is allowed to argue his
own side and to respond to the views of the other, and if a decision is then
rendered by someone partial to neither, it will best air the issues and lead to a
just result. 50 Cases like Mathews simply implement the same due process
values developed within the court system in other settings, whether
administrative agency proceedings or judicial settings outside of trial. 5' The
basic premise of the civil due process model, in this respect, is both
longstanding and uncontroversial.
52
Within this civil model of procedural due process lie at least four distinct
elements, explained in greater detail below: participatory procedures (the
affected party is present); an unbiased adjudicator (the decision-maker is a
neutral nonparty); prior process (the hearing precedes the adverse action); and
continuity (hearing rights attach at all stages). These features are worth
highlighting because, as we shall see, assumptions about due process that are
fundamental in civil settings can be absent from the constitutional doctrines
that govern the pretrial criminal process.
First, as applied in civil settings, due process places central importance on
the participation of the affected party in decision-making. Ex parte procedures
simply the Mathews test that is inapplicable but the very premise that adversary hearings should precede
governmental deprivations. See infra Section lI.B. This reflects a more fundamental disagreement.
49. See, e.g., Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) (emphasizing that "our adversarial system of
justice" is "premised on the well-tested principle that truth-as well as fairness-is best discovered by
powerful statements on both sides of the question" (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984) ("The very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that
partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be
convicted and the innocent go free." (quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975))).
50. See, e.g., Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) ("Our system assumes that
adversarial testing will ultimately advance the public interest in truth and fairness."); Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977) ("[D]ebate between adversaries is often essential to the truth-seeking
function...."); McGrath, 341 U.S. at 171-72 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("No better instrument has
been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case
against him and opportunity to meet it.").
51. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The Empirical and Normative
Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 783, 807 (2004) (explaining that in
entitlement cases such as Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court "required that final decision making
about government entitlements employ judicial modes of process to ensure fairness").
52. See, e.g., Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 336, 350 (1850) ("No principle is more
vital to the administration of justice, than that no man shall be condemned in his person or property
without notice, and an opportunity to make his defence."); Oakley v. Aspinwall, 4 N.Y. 513, 518 (1851)
("It is a first principle in the administration of justice, that no one shall be condemned, nor be made to
suffer, either in his person, fame, or estate, before he has had an opportunity to be heard in his
defence."). More controversial is Mathews' three-part test, which might reasonably be critiqued for its
lack of guidance and undue flexibility.
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are the exception, while participatory procedures are the rule. 53 Notice and an
opportunity to be heard is, obviously, the principle without which a
participatory model of justice cannot work effectively. Unless a party is
notified that there is a controversy, it cannot participate in decision-making;
unless a party has the opportunity for a hearing, it cannot present its side of the
controversy; and unless the decision-maker hears from both parties, there
cannot be a meaningful ruling.54 This is the adversary system's vision of
justice.
Second, a core element of procedural due process is that the decision-maker
must be scrupulously neutral-neither biased in favor of either side, nor
charged with responsibilities that would interfere with her ability "to hold the
balance nice, clear and true" between the parties. 55 This is an indispensable
element of procedural due process, applicable even when circumstances call for
only a rudimentary due process hearing. 56 A neutral decision-maker, required
by due process principles, is not simply a person without a financial interest in
the outcome of the case, but more broadly a person who is not affiliated with,
or biased in favor of or against, one side or the other.57 This rule too is a natural
corollary of the party-dominated adversary process. A decision-maker cannot
act as both a party and a neutral, because the two roles are fundamentally
53. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972) ("[Flaimess can rarely be obtained by
secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights." (quoting McGrath, 341 U.S. at 170
(Frankfurter, J., concurring))).
54. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 223, 233 (1864) ("Parties whose rights are to be
affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.").
55. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927). See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535
(2004) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (noting that due process requires an "impartial adjudicator").
The cases expressing this principle are too numerous to list; for some notable examples, see Concrete
Pipe & Products v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602 (1993); Marshall v. Jerrico,
Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980); Ward v. City of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania,
400 U.S. 455 (1971); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); and Tumey, 273 U.S. 510. Indeed,
Professors Redish and Marshall argue that the "participation of an independent adjudicator" is the core
procedural due process requirement, more paramount even than participatory rights to notice and an
opportunity to be heard. See Redish & Marshall, supra note 3, at 475.
56. See, e.g., Marshall, 446 U.S. at 242-43 (emphasizing that the Court has "jealously guarded" the
due process requirement of a neutral decision-maker by applying this requirement "in a variety of
settings," including warrants issued by justices of the peace, state optometry board disciplinary hearings,
and parole revocation proceedings); Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523 (holding that a liquor possession charge
tried before a city mayor who receives a share of the fees imposed does not satisfy the due process
requirement for a disinterested judge). In Hamdi, similarly, while the Court's plurality would have
allowed a relatively minimal hearing on a detainee's status as an "enemy combatant" to satisfy due
process, it insisted that the person presiding over the hearing be a "neutral decision-maker." 542 U.S. at
537 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (holding that "interrogation by one's captor" does not satisfy due
process impartiality requirements).
57. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486 (1972) (holding, in a parole revocation case,
that due process requires that review of a challenged government action be conducted "by someone not
directly involved in the case"). As Justice O'Connor emphasized in Hamdi, a fair and impartial
adjudicator cannot have an "interest in the controversy." See 542 U.S. at 537 (O'Connor, J., plurality
opinion) ("[I]nterrogation by one's captor.., hardly constitutes a constitutionally adequate factfinding
before a neutral decisionmaker.").
Yale Law & Policy Review
incompatible. 58 This is encapsulated in the traditional statement of due process:
"[N]o man shall be a judge in his own cause." 59
The third critical component of procedural due process, as conventionally
understood, is that process must ordinarily precede rather than follow the
deprivation. In the classic due process model used in civil cases, the
constitutionally required notice and hearing must be provided at a "meaningful
time." 60 This model has little tolerance for governmental actions that deprive
persons of protected interests without first offering some notice-and-hearing
process. The default rule is that notice and a hearing must be provided before
the government takes adverse action, except in exigent circumstances. 61 In the
limited circumstances when the government may take action before a hearing,
the process required must be provided as soon as possible thereafter. 62 When a
hearing can be readily provided prior to the deprivation, a post-deprivation
hearing will not suffice to satisfy due process.
Finally, due process hearing rights come into play for any deprivation that
is "not de minimis," and they apply to interim as well as final deprivations.
63
Civil precedents reflect a continuum in which procedural due process
protections come into play whenever governmental action threatens a
cognizable deprivation of private interests, but the extent of those protections
varies with the severity of the deprivation and the importance of the
government's interest.64 Due process requires hearing procedures with respect
to temporary or preliminary deprivations, as well as for those that are final and
permanent.
65
58. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 534 ("A situation in which an official perforce occupies two practically and
seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other judicial, necessarily involves a lack of due
process of law in the trial of defendants charged with crimes before him.").
59. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 197 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (quoting Dr. Bonham's Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B.)).
60. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) ("It is... fundamental that the right to
notice and an opportunity to be heard must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
61. Id. at 90-91 ("Only in a few limited situations has this Court allowed outright seizure without
opportunity for a prior hearing."); see, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43,
53 (1993) ("We tolerate some exceptions to the general rule requiring predeprivation notice and hearing,
but only in 'extraordinary situations."'); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971) (noting the
"root requirement that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any
significant property interest, except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest
is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event").
62. See, e.g., Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485 (stating that a preliminary hearing to support a parolee's
arrest and detention on charges of parole violation should be held "as promptly as convenient after
arrest").
63. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975) (noting that due process hearing rights attach to the
suspension of a public school student for ten days or less).
64. See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 378 (stating that the formality of due process hearing procedures "can
vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent
proceedings").
65. See, e.g., Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 85 (noting that it is "now well settled that a temporary, nonfinal
deprivation of property" falls within due process protection).
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If extensive proceedings will ultimately take place before a final decision,
this may affect the hearing procedures required at the outset.66 If government
rules provide, for example, for a full evidentiary hearing after termination of
government employment, the pretermination hearing may be more limited. 67 If
a full civil trial will ensue, a preliminary hearing on the interim seizure of the
disputed property may provide more minimal review.68 Still, in the classic due
process model, "some kind of hearing" generally must be provided whenever a
cognizable deprivation is threatened, and that hearing must meet certain
minimum notice-and-hearing requirements.
69
In the ordinary course, the government cannot dispense entirely with a pre-
deprivation hearing before a neutral adjudicator, even if it is willing to offer
extensive procedural protections after the fact. In a civil suit, for example, a
court could not constitutionally issue a preliminary injunction sua sponte
enjoining a company from operating its business on the sole ground that the
company will have a full opportunity at trial to demonstrate that its business is
lawful. Separate due process hearing rights attach to the preliminary injunction
itself.70
In sum, the civil due process model reflected in cases like Mathews is
grounded in a large body of constitutional precedent interpreting procedural
due process as a basic requirement for notice and a hearing. These due process
principles are thought to vindicate both the American abhorrence of arbitrary
government action and the value Americans place on direct citizen participation
in government decision-making. 7 1 As a logical matter, it is hard to see why
66. See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 378 ("The formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary,
depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent
proceedings.").
67. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545-46 (1985) (finding that
when a terminated government employee will be "later entitled to a full administrative hearing and
judicial review," the pre-termination hearing may simply provide a "determination of whether there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed
action").
68. See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(finding that when a civil defendant will ultimately receive a "plenary adverse adjudication of the
underlying claim against her," the due process hearing to support a pretrial property seizure should be
aimed at establishing the "probable validity" of the underlying claim).
69. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972); see, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
576 (1977) ("Appellees were excluded from school only temporarily, it is true, but the length and
consequent severity of a deprivation, while another factor to weigh in determining the appropriate form
of hearing, 'is not decisive of the basic right' to a hearing of some kind." (citation omitted)).
70. See sources cited supra note 17.
71. See, e.g., Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (explaining that the "two central
concerns of procedural due process" include "the prevention of unjustified or mistaken deprivations and
the promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking process").
Social science data support the soundness of the theoretical premises of the notice-and-hearing model of
due process. See, e.g., Stephen Landsman, So What? Possible Implications of the Vanishing Trial
Phenomenon, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 973, 976 (2004) ("What people generally look to in
assessing legitimacy is just what the Supreme Court seems to suggest: neutral, respectful, and
participatory procedures.").
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notice-and-hearing rights would not attach to any government deprivation of
liberty or property, whether in a civil matter or in criminal litigation. Yet this is
not always so in criminal cases, as this Article explores below.
II. THE CONTOURS OF CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS
The Supreme Court approaches procedural due process quite differently in
its criminal and civil decisions, both in how it talks about due process and how
it conceptualizes what due process requires. While the Court's civil and
administrative precedents express a clear due process approach, exemplified in
Mathews, no single doctrinal approach to procedural due process emerges from
the Court's criminal decisions. 72 Equally significant, procedural due process
rules in criminal cases can be quite different from their civil counterparts. The
body of criminal due process precedents is highly protective of defendants in
many regards. 73 At the same time, due process hearing rights that are routine in
the pretrial stages of civil cases can be absent from parallel stages of the
criminal process, despite the comparable or greater interests at stake. 74 Both the
Court's talk and its walk are important elements of its distinctive approach to
"criminal due process." Each of these aspects is explored below, beginning
with the way the Court talks differently about procedural due process in its
criminal cases.
In a civil case, the courts approach procedural due process challenges in a
straightforward fashion by asking, first, whether there is a protected "liberty" or
"property" interest at stake. 75 If so, a constitutional right to a participatory
hearing exists, and the question becomes how formal or informal that hearing
76
must be. This is the civil due process approach, laid out above, which applies
in court cases as well as administrative proceedings. In criminal cases, by
contrast, there is no clear or uniform doctrinal approach to procedural due
process claims.77 For a period of time, the Supreme Court applied the same
72. In Professor Israel's impressive and comprehensive article on free-standing due process in
criminal cases, he thoroughly canvasses the varied doctrinal approaches used by the Supreme Court to
determine the content of due process in criminal cases before finally concluding that in the criminal
arena, the Court has used "inconsistent guidelines" and failed to attach "precedential weight to its
general descriptions of the character of due process." Israel, supra note 12, at 429.
73. See infra Section II.A.
74. See infra Section II.B.
75. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977) (noting that the first stage of the
"familiar two-stage analysis" for procedural due process is to determine "whether the asserted individual
interests are encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of 'life, liberty or property').
76. See, e.g., id. (noting that in the second stage of the "familiar" due process inquiry, "if protected
interests are implicated, we then must decide what procedures constitute 'due process of law"').
77. Indeed, the Supreme Court at times decides due process claims in criminal cases not only
without articulating a general test, but without explaining whether the due process claim is substantive
or procedural in nature. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 301-02 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[lI]n Winship, we found it unnecessary to clarify whether our holding rested on substantive or
procedural due process grounds; it was enough to say that the 'Due Process Clause' itself requires proof
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Mathews test used in civil settings to decide procedural due process challenges
in criminal proceedings as well, although not frequently. 78 More recently, in
Medina v. California, the Court reversed course, concluding that Mathews is
not applicable to criminal prosecutions (at least not to state prosecutions).79 In
this case, the Court opted instead for a historic approach to deciding procedural
due process challenges in criminal cases.80 The decision is better read,
however, as a rejection of the Mathews balancing test than as a departure from
its core idea that due process grants hearing rights.81 It is clear from precedents
contemporaneous with Medina that history alone is not the determinative
factor; basic principles about notice and the right to a meaningful hearing
continue to inform the Court's rulings in criminal as well as civil due process
challenges. 82 In short, to the extent a dominant approach is reflected in the
Court's recent criminal cases, it suggests that the process due in criminal cases
beyond a reasonable doubt." (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)); Winship, 397 U.S. at 363
(reasoning simply that "[t]he reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of
criminal procedure").
78. See. e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (citing Mathews for the
proposition that government action that deprives an individual of life, liberty, or property "must still be
implemented in a fair matter" as a matter of procedural due process even if the action "survives
substantive due process scrutiny"); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (applying the Mathews
test to a due process challenge to a state's refusal to provide the defendant access to psychiatric
assistance in preparing his defense); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980) (applying the
Mathews test to a due process challenge to criminal procedures that allowed a magistrate to hear
suppression motions).
79. 505 U.S. 437, 445-46 (1992) (concluding, in a due process challenge to a state criminal
prosecution, that a "narrower inquiry" is more appropriate than the Mathews balancing test). A prime
justification for the more deferential approach adopted in Medina was that "dealing with crime is... the
business of the States." Id. at 445 (citing Irving v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134 (1954)). See generally I
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 11, § 2.7(b) (stating that in more recent decisions, the Court "has
concluded that it should not apply to the criminal justice process the utilitarian balancing approach
commonly used in determining the independent content of due process as applied to administrative
proceedings").
80. See Medina, 505 U.S. at 445-46 (arguing that instead of the Mathews test, due process in
criminal cases requires application of the more deferential test of Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,
202 (1977), which considers whether the challenged procedure "offends some principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental").
81. The Court has made clear in other contexts that the Mathews balancing test is distinct and
separable from the core Mathews premise that notice and a hearing should precede deprivations of
liberty and property. See, e.g., Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167-68 (2002) (rejecting the
application of the Mathews test while reaffirming that due process guarantees that "individuals whose
property interests are at stake are entitled to 'notice and an opportunity to be heard' (citation omitted));
Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 176-79 (1994) (rejecting the applicability of Mathews while
reaffirming that "a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process" (citation omitted)).
82. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 363 (1996) (considering whether a state criminal
procedure challenged under the Due Process Clause "imposes a significant risk of an erroneous
determination"); Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727 (1992) (emphasizing in a criminal prosecution
that due process requires that the jury be "impartial and indifferent"); Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110,
121 (1991) (emphasizing in a criminal due process challenge "the importance that we attach to the
concept of fair notice as the bedrock of any constitutionally fair procedure"). See generally I CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, supra note 11, § 2.7(b) (observing that the concern expressed in cases like Medina "has not
prevented the Court from imposing due process requirements invalidating practices that had been
followed for many years in many states").
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should be heavily influenced by historic tradition,83 but this doctrine has neither
the clarity nor the consistency of the civil due process test.
Hamdi is symbolic of this doctrinal split between the clear due process
rules on the civil side and the more vague criminal approach. While Justice
O'Connor argued that Mathews provides the "ordinary mechanism" for
determining the procedures called for by due process, 84 Justice Scalia countered
that Mathews is inapplicable in criminal litigation.85 While Justice O'Connor
applied the conventional notice-and-hearing approach to Hamdi's civil
detention, 86 Justice Scalia's vision of criminal due process was a historic model
that incorporates "those common-law procedures traditionally deemed
necessary before depriving a person of life, liberty or property." 87 In his view,
due process should have afforded Hamdi the right to be charged with whatever
criminal conduct the government believed it could sustain, and to be detained
and tried through the regular criminal process, from accusation to trial.88
Though Justice Scalia was, of course, addressing the same due process right as
Justice O'Connor-the "due process" guarantee of the Fifth Amendment-
there is no readily apparent common ground between the criminal process
model of due process he advanced and her notice-and-hearing formulation.
More fundamentally, the problem is not simply that the Supreme Court
talks differently about due process in criminal cases, but that it also applies due
process quite differently in criminal settings. The basic assumption about due
process in the civil model-that government deprivations of liberty or property
should be accompanied by hearing rights-has not been applied to all stages of
a criminal case as it has in civil litigation. In civil settings, as noted, procedural
83. See, e.g., Medina, 505 U.S. at 446 ("Historical practice is probative of whether a procedural
rule can be characterized as fundamental."); see also, e.g., Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43-44
(1996) (same); Cooper, 517 U.S. at 355-56 (same); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 407-08 (1993)
(same). But see Medina, 505 U.S. at 454 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (reading Medina as a holding that
history creates a rebuttable presumption that a challenged practice comports with due process, because
"[a]ny less charitable reading of the Court's opinion would put it at odds with many of our criminal due
process cases, in which we have required States to institute procedures that were neither required at
common law nor explicitly commanded by the text of the Constitution").
84. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528-29 (2004) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion)
(emphasizing that the "ordinary mechanism that we use ... for determining the procedures that are
necessary to ensure that a citizen is not 'deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law' . . . is the test that we articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge").
85. See id. at 575-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Mathews "has no place" when the
Constitution and common law prescribe the elements of process due, as in criminal cases).
86. See id. at 533 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (holding that "a citizen-detainee seeking to
challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral
decisionmaker").
87. Id. at 556 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. See id. at 576 (emphasizing that the government must either "hand him over to the criminal
authorities, whose detention for the purpose of prosecution will be lawful, or release him"); see also id.
(arguing that Hamdi has a due process right to traditional common law criminal proceedings, including
"an accusation, a hearing before an impartial tribunal, with proper jurisdiction, and a conviction and
judgment" before punishment may be inflicted).
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due process rights fall on a continuum of greater and lesser deprivations, in
which hearing rights come into play for any governmental deprivation that is
not de minimis, but the extent of the hearing varies with the circumstances.8 9 In
criminal litigation, by contrast, the standard notice-and-hearing approach has
made inroads into some parts of the criminal process outside of trial (most
notably at sentencing), but it has not been consistently applied. 90 Most
importantly, the criminal pretrial process remains largely exempt from the
constitutional premise that adversary hearings should precede interim
deprivations of liberty and property interests.
9 1
The net result of the Court's criminal due process doctrines, as relevant
here, is that the pretrial stages of a criminal proceeding are virtually
unregulated constitutionally, even though serious deprivations may be
involved, while the criminal trial itself is attended by extensive procedural
protections, even though criminal trials are rarely held. 92 For litigants who go to
trial, the criminal model is highly protective. 93 But for those who do not, the
criminal model is decidedly lacking in constitutional protections when
compared with comparable stages of civil litigation. The specific principles of
procedural due process that create these results are explored below, with a
focus on the puzzling rules that govern due process in the pretrial stages of a
criminal case.
89. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ('It has been said so often by this Court
and others as not to require citation of authority that due process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands."); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971)
(noting that the formality of due process hearing procedures "can vary, depending upon the importance
of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings").
90. See infra text accompanying notes 212-215 (applying notice-and-hearing rights in sentencing);
infra notes 201-211 and accompanying text (applying notice-and-hearing rights to aspects of
preventative detention hearing); see also King v. Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. 271, 275 (E.D. Pa. 1986)
("[R]evocation of bail sua sponte without a hearing and without a statement of reasons constitutes an
arbitrary denial of a state-created right in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
procedural due process.").
91. See infra Section l.B.
92. Statistics show that only a very small percentage of criminal defendants proceed to trial. See,
e.g., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Facts & Figures tbl.5.5,
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/Table505.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2006) (showing that in
2005, 4.5% of defendants in federal criminal cases went to trial, while over 86% entered guilty pleas).
93. This explains why litigants like Hamdi seek to be criminally prosecuted, rather than subjected
to the more minimalist civil detention procedures. The enemy combatant cases present the unusual
circumstance in which the individuals are insisting on the right to be criminally prosecuted, while the
government is insisting on civil procedures. See Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 584-85 (4th Cir. 2005)
(concerning a challenge brought by Jose Padilla, an alleged enemy combatant, who argued that due
process required that he be criminally prosecuted or released). This reflects the other side of the
criminal-civil split--civil due process may grant hearing rights at all stages of a civil case, but it can be
unduly flexible in permitting civil hearing procedures that are remarkably minimal given the interests at
stake. See, e.g., Carl Jones, Padilla's New Status: Indictment in Miami Against Alleged Terrorist a
Sudden End to Years of Detention Without Charge, MIAMI DAILY Bus. REv., Nov. 23, 2005 ("With the
stroke of a pen, President George Bush transformed alleged terrorist Jose Padilla from an enemy
combatant with few legal rights to a criminal defendant protected by the Bill of Rights.").
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A. Criminal Due Process at Trial
It is true that at trial, a criminal defendant receives an impressive degree of
"process" constitutionally required to adjudicate his guilt or innocence. Many
of these rights are provided by the express terms of the Bill of Rights. The
Sixth Amendment, for example, grants a criminal defendant the right to a
speedy trial, the right to trial by jury, the right to assistance of counsel, the right
to compulsory process, and the right to confront the government's witnesses.94
The Fifth Amendment grants a criminal defendant the right against compulsory
self-incrimination, and protects the defendant against being placed in jeopardy
twice for the same offense. 95 The Fourth Amendment (as judicially interpreted)
bars the introduction at his criminal trial of evidence seized in violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights.
96
But due process itself also provides additional protections at trial, both
substantive and procedural. Beyond the explicit guarantees of the Bill of Rights
described above, the Supreme Court has found implicit in the constitutional
guarantee of "due process of law" a number of additional "free-standing" rights
that attach at a criminal trial. 97 Notwithstanding the Court's rhetoric at times
suggesting a limited role for freestanding due process, 98 the Supreme Court has
taken a relatively expansive view of due process in the context of a criminal
trial. 99 Beyond the specific rights spelled out in the Bill of Rights, for example,
it is due process that grants the defendant such central protections as the right to
an unbiased judge,' 00 the right to a presumption of innocence, l0 ' the right to
have the government prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt,'0 2 and the right
94. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
95. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
96. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
97. "Free-standing" due process refers to constitutional requirements the Court has read into the
Due Process Clause itself, aside from any specific provisions of the Bill of Rights that may also come
into play. See Israel, supra note 12, at 305.
98. See, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992) ("The Bill of Rights speaks in explicit
terms to many aspects of criminal procedure, and the expansion of those constitutional guarantees under
the open-ended rubric of the Due Process Clause invites undue interference with both considered
legislative judgments and the careful balance that the Constitution strikes between liberty and order.");
Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990) ("Beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the
Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited operation.").
99. See Israel, supra note 12, at 305 (noting the "steady stream of... Supreme Court rulings
applying the independent content of due process to the state and federal criminal justice processes").
100. See sources cited supra note 55.
101. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) ("The presumption of innocence, although
not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal
justice."); Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) ("The principle that there is a presumption
of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its
enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.").
102. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged.").
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to obtain exculpatory evidence in the government's possession.10 3 Due process
also prevents a defendant from being tried when he is mentally incompetent,
1°4
and from being criminally punished without an adjudication of guilt. 05 While
none of these rights is expressly spelled out in the Constitution, the Court has
found each of them constitutionally required as part of the criminal process of
conviction and punishment that is guaranteed by "due process."'
10 6
Procedural due process has also made substantial inroads on the criminal
sentencing process.10 7 Criminal sentencing, which was traditionally lightly
regulated on the premise that it was not directed at establishing the defendant's
guilt or innocence but at rehabilitating the defendant, 0 8 is now subject to
notice-and-hearing due process rules that require that the defendant be given
notice and an opportunity for a meaningful hearing before the sentence is
imposed. 10 9 Modem due process doctrine recognizes that adversary procedural
rights are needed at this stage, just as at the criminal trial, because the length
and terms of the sentence implicate the defendant's liberty interests no less than
conviction itself. The judge's determination of the length of the sentence, or her
choice between a prison term, home confinement, or probation, may affect the
defendant's interests as keenly as the fact of conviction.''
0
In short, the criminal trial itself, extending through the sentencing process,
103. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("[T]he suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment .... ).
104. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 439 (1992) ("It is well established that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is
not competent to stand trial."); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975) (same); Pate v. Robinson, 383
U.S. 375 (1966) (same).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (stating that substantive due
process bars "punishment before trial"); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 167 (1963)
(stating that "punishment cannot be imposed without a prior criminal trial and all its incidents"). See
generally Israel, supra note 12, at 391-93 (detailing an impressive array of due process protections that
come into play at a criminal trial).
106. The defendant also has certain due process hearing rights with respect to proceedings that
occur in anticipation of trial, such as suppression hearings. See generally 1 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
supra note 11, § 2.7(a) (discussing the protections extended by due process in pretrial hearings).107. See, e.g., Israel, supra note 12, at 393 (noting that at a criminal sentencing, "due process
becomes the primary source of constitutional regulation").
108. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) (emphasizing the traditional rule that
"[t]ribunals passing on the guilt of a defendant always have been hedged in by strict evidentiary
procedural limitations" but that sentencing judges have far wider discretion); see also Specht v.
Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 606 (1967) (noting that Williams espoused the traditional rule that due process
does "not require a judge to have hearings and to give a convicted person an opportunity to participate in
those hearings when he came to determine the sentence to be imposed").
109. See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) ("[I]t is now clear that the sentencing
process, as well as the trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.").
110. See, e.g., Bums v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 148 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that
a convicted defendant has a "lively concern" with an erroneous sentencing calculation, and that this
concern gives rise to procedural due process rights). The Supreme Court has also applied due process to
grant notice-and-hearing rights in parole and probation revocation proceedings, which are closely related
to the criminal process but are deemed civil in nature. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,480
(1972) (noting that "the revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution").
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is premised on a due process model with adversary testing and participatory
rights. This model reflects the same basic notice-and-hearing values expressed
in the Court's procedural due process rulings in civil and administrative
settings. The same cannot be said, however, when the focus turns to the
Supreme Court cases that govern the preliminary stages of the criminal process.
Here, the Court's constitutional model permits a nonadversary, closed process
that fails to provide for partisan testing of the government's charges and leaves
little room for the defendant's meaningful participation. This occurs even
though the defendant may have very significant liberty and property interests at
stake.
B. Criminal Due Process Before Trial
In the preliminary stages of the criminal process, not surprisingly, very
substantial deprivations of the accused person's protected interests can occur.
Some harmful effects flow simply from being charged with a criminal
offense.'11 But the burden of a criminal prosecution is rarely limited to an
accusation alone. Other burdens frequently follow as part of the preliminary
steps taken by the government to bring an alleged offender to justice. The
accused is often arrested and, following arrest, subjected to a litany of
bureaucratic procedures such as fingerprinting and photographing. 12 More
seriously, an accused may be detained in prison pending trial. 13 Based on the
criminal charge, the government may also seek to seize the defendant's
property, to limit his freedom to travel, to suspend his government
employment, to bar him from government contracting, or to take other
measures to protect governmental interests while the case is pending. 114
111. See, e.g., United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977) ("[A] formal accusation may interfere
with the defendant's liberty .... disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his
associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends."
(internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) ("Arrest is a
public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and
that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to
public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends.").
112. See, e.g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 66 n.2 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting that an arrestee should not be subjected to such "indignities" as "cataloguing of his
personal effects, fingerprinting, photographing, etc.," without a judicial determination that probable
cause supports the charges).
113. Defendants may be held in prison pending trial when detention is needed to assure that the
accused "will stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty," Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951),
and for the additional purpose of preventing defendants from committing further crimes, United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987). As a practical matter, many defendants are also detained until trial
because they cannot afford bail. Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework for Compensating
Pretrial Detainees, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 1947, 1950 (2005) ("[T]he vast majority of detainees languish
in detention primarily because they are guilty of being too poor to meet bail.").
114. See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 278 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("A person
facing serious criminal charges is hardly freed from the state's control upon his release from a police
officer's physical grip. He is required to appear in court at the state's command. He is often subject ...
to the condition that he seek formal permission from the court (at significant expense) before exercising
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These are clearly the types of burdens that the Court would normally view
as deprivations of "liberty" or "property" sufficient to invoke procedural due
process protections. Physical deprivations of a person's liberty are, of course,
among the most serious types of governmental deprivations from a due process
perspective. 115 Similarly, the seizure of property and the suspension of
government employment also clearly constitute the type of "property" interests
protected in the Court's due process cases." 6 But beyond the clear case of
physical seizures, the Court has made clear that the liberty protected by due
process is not "merely freedom from bodily restraint."' 17 Lesser restrictions-
such as limitations on the freedom to travel or conditions attached to the
defendant's release on bond-are also constitutionally cognizable liberty
deprivations. The deprivation of these interests would normally give rise to a
right to notice and a hearing before an impartial decision-maker in the civil
context.
This is not always so in the criminal context. While the defendant may have
extensive due process hearing rights at a criminal trial and sentencing, the
Court has frequently held that due process does not necessarily require
extending comparable hearing rights to the defendant in the initial stages of a
criminal case.' 18 Compared to the due process protections routinely afforded to
what would otherwise be his unquestioned right to travel outside the jurisdiction. Pending prosecution,
his employment prospects may be diminished severely, he may suffer reputational harm, and he will
experience the financial and emotional strain of preparing a defense."); FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230
(1988) (concerning an FDIC suspension of an indicted bank president); James A. Merritt & Sons v.
Marsh, 791 F.2d 328 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that the Defense Department could suspend an indicted
government contractor from competing for government contracts).
115. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion)
(describing as "the most elemental of liberty interests ... the interest in being free from physical
detention by one's own government"); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) ("Freedom from
bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from
arbitrary governmental action."); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977) ("While the
contours of this historic liberty interest in the context of our federal system of government have not been
defined precisely, they always have been thought to encompass freedom from bodily restraint and
punishment.").
116. See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 49 (1993) (holding that
ownership of real property is a protected interest under due process); Mallen, 486 U.S. at 240 (holding
that a continuing employment relationship with federal institution is a protected property interest); Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573 (1975) (finding that an employee's entitlement to continued government
employment absent discharge for cause is a protected property interest).
117. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 & n.1 1(1972); see also, e.g., Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (holding that the term "liberty" in the Due Process Clause "is not confined to
mere freedom from bodily restraint").
118. See, e.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143 (1979) (emphasizing that "an adversary
hearing is not required" to support the pretrial detention of a criminal defendant); Ingraham, 430 U.S. at
697-98 (noting that the Supreme Court has "rejected the argument that procedural protections required
in [the Court's civil] due process cases should be afforded to a criminal suspect arrested without a
warrant"); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27 (1975) (holding that the Fourth Amendment's
nonadversary review procedures define the only "process that is due for seizures of person or property in
criminal cases, including the detention of suspects pending trial"); Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586,
590 (1913) (holding that due process does not require an adversary judicial hearing at outset of criminal
prosecution). See generally 4 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 11, § 14.2(a) (noting that the Supreme
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lesser interests in the civil context, this doctrine is striking. It is not an
exaggeration to say that defendants constitutionally may be arrested, charged,
prosecuted, and detained in prison pending trial with fewer meaningful review
procedures-that is to say, procedures to test the legitimacy of the underlying
charges-than due process would require in the preliminary stages of a private
civil case seeking the return of household goods. 119 The criminal system places
enormous trust in the good faith of prosecutors, with relatively little judicial or
public oversight except at trial.
Before dissecting the complex due process doctrines that set the procedural
floor for criminal pretrial procedures, it is useful to answer a basic question:
given that criminal defendants appear before the judge for various purposes
before trial, in what sense can it be said that defendants do not enjoy pretrial
due process hearing rights? To be clear, this Article does not suggest that a
criminal defendant receives no "process" in the early stages of a criminal case.
A typical defendant is processed within the criminal system through some
combination of pretrial steps, which commonly include certain judicial
hearings. Hearings may be held, for example, to issue an arrest warrant, to
conduct post-arrest review after a warrantless arrest (a so-called Gerstein
hearing), 12  to arraign the defendant, to set bail, to rule on a governmental
motion for preventative detention, and so on.12 1 While judicial proceedings
related to arrest are held ex parte (for evident and not-so-evident reasons), 122
the preliminary steps in a criminal prosecution also typically include hearings
before the court at which the defendant is present and may even have a right to
counsel.123 In this limited sense, the defendant receives some "adversary"
process in the pretrial criminal process. Arraignment and bail, for example,
Court has stated in some cases that "due process provides no procedural protection" for the defendant's
interests in avoiding pretrial restraints).
119. Hence Justice Stewart's observation mentioned above; see supra note 15. Compare, e.g.,
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120-25 (stating that a defendant may be arrested and detained pending trial based
on a nonadversary proceeding), with Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-83 (1972) (holding that an
adversary hearing is required before the government's preliminary seizure of an oven and a stereo).
120. This hearing is named after Gerstein, 420 U.S. 103, discussed at length below.
121. See generally I CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 11, § 1.4 (describing the typical steps in a
criminal prosecution).
122. Proceedings on an arrest warrant require secrecy, lest the defendant flee to avoid arrest. But
even the post-arrest review required by the Fourth Amendment to allow the defendant's continued
detention may constitutionally be conducted as an ex parte proceeding, even though there is no longer
any similar risk. See generally 1 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 11, § 1.30) (noting that a Gerstein
hearing "ordinarily is an exparte determination, similar to that made in the issuance of an arrest warrant
and relying on the same sources of information").
123. It is clear that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends beyond the trial
itself, to every "critical stage" in a criminal prosecution. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961).
Depending on the particular criminal system, pretrial proceedings such as arraignment, bail hearings,
and preliminary hearings may be "critical stages" to which the right to counsel attaches. See, e.g.,
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10 (1970) (finding a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the
preliminary hearing); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932) (finding a Sixth Amendment right to
counsel at arraignment).
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immediately come to mind as routine pretrial stages at which a defendant has
the opportunity to appear before the court.
124
More to the point, however, these routine pretrial criminal hearings would
not satisfy normal due process rules because they are not designed to test the
issue that is most fundamental from a due process perspective-whether
sufficient evidence of criminal wrongdoing exists to justify depriving the
defendant of liberty and property interests pending trial. 125 Instead, these are
more properly viewed as administrative steps designed to process the case and
bring the defendant to trial. 126 Arraignment, for example, is simply an initial
court appearance typically limited to such preliminary matters as informing the
defendant of the charges and of his rights, determining whether counsel should
be appointed, or determining how the defendant will plead.127 Similarly, the
focus at a bail hearing is narrow. The traditional bail inquiry concerns the risk
that the defendant will not appear for trial, and seeks to set bail conditions to
ensure the defendant's later appearance. I12 To the extent the judge at a bail
hearing considers the evidence of the crime, it is simply to determine whether
the evidence is so strong that the defendant is unlikely to appear for trial if
released, not to make an assessment whether the government has presented
sufficient evidence to justify restricting the defendant's liberty or property
rights pending trial.1
29
124. There is a long statutory tradition permitting criminal defendants to be released on bail,
provided they do not present a risk of flight. See, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) ("From the
passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789 ... to the present Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ... federal
law has unequivocally provided that a person arrested for a non-capital offense shall be admitted to
bail."); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2000).
125. As Hamdi makes clear, due process requires not simply a hearing but a meaningful adversary
review of the "factual basis" for adverse government action. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509
(2004).
126. As will be discussed below, pretrial proceedings in criminal cases are not generally designed
to review the merits of the government's criminal charges, but to determine how the defendant will
plead, whether he is a flight risk, and so on.
127. See I CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 11, § 1.3(k) n. 176 (using the term "arraignment" to
"refer[] simply to calling a person before a court to be notified of criminal charges"). Arraignment is
also used to refer to an appearance at which the defendant enters his initial plea to the charge. Id; see
also id. § 1.3(o) (after formal criminal charges, "the defendant is arraigned-i.e., he is brought before
the trial court, informed of the charges against him, and asked to enter a plea of guilty, not guilty, or, as
is permitted under some circumstances, nolo contendere"); id. § 1.3(k) (first appearance of defendant,
also known as arraignment, "often is a quite brief proceeding").
128. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (2000) (stating that bail should not be granted if the court finds
that "release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person" at subsequent proceedings); cf 4
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 11, § 12.1 (b) ("The typical state statute declares that the objective of
bail is to secure the defendant's attendance at the proceedings against him and to prevent his punishment
before conviction."). Since 1984, the federal bail statute has also permitted pretrial detention of a
defendant not simply for the traditional goal of ensuring his appearance at trial but to prevent him from
committing further crimes ("preventative detention"). See Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142
(2000); see generally United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754-55 (1987) (upholding the federal
preventative detention scheme).
129. State bail statutes commonly allow the court to consider, in setting bail, the government's
assessment of the "strength of the case against the defendant, as communicated by the prosecutor or
police." 4 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 11, § 12.1(b). The federal pretrial detention statute reads
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Beyond arraignment and bail, there is a common pretrial procedure known
as a preliminary hearing (or preliminary examination). 130 This is an adversary
proceeding, established by statute, that on its face seems to contemplate pretrial
judicial review of the sufficiency of the government's evidence. 131 When a
preliminary hearing is held, it is a judicial hearing at which the defendant is
present and has procedural rights, designed to test whether the government's
evidence displays probable cause to support the criminal charges-akin in
function to a civil hearing on a motion seeking pretrial relief, if not quite as
protective.132
While preliminary hearings, if held, provide some opportunity for criminal
defendants to test the government's evidence, because they are not
constitutionally required, they are offered if at all as a matter of legislative
grace. 133 Such hearings are infrequent in the federal criminal system,134 and are
selectively offered in state criminal systems.' 35 The net result is that while the
similarly. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2000) (allowing court to consider the "weight of the evidence
against" the defendant). Such statutes, however, merely permit the weight of the evidence to be
considered for the limited purpose of assessing the likelihood that the defendant will appear for trial-if
the evidence is strong, there is a greater likelihood the defendant will flee. See, e.g., United States v.
Edson, 487 F.2d 370, 372 (1st Cir. 1973) ("Until a defendant has been convicted, the nature of the
offense, as well as the evidence of guilt, is to be considered only in terms of the likelihood of his making
himself unavailable for trial."). Such laws do not grant the defendant a right to judicial review of the
sufficiency of the government's evidence at the time of bail. Indeed, at a bail hearing, the government's
assessment of the case is commonly submitted by proffer, rather than the introduction of evidence. See,
e.g., United States v. Abuhamra, 389 F.3d 309, 321 n.7 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Most [bail hearings] proceed on
proffers.").
130. See I CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 11, § 1.3(l) ("The preliminary hearing.., provides
screening in an adversary proceeding in which both sides are represented by counsel.").
131. See, e.g., I CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 11, § 1.3(l) (noting that in a preliminary
hearing, the magistrate judge must "determine whether, on the evidence presented, there is probable
cause to believe that defendant committed the crime charged").
132. See id.; see also infra note 141. While the preliminary hearing is roughly akin in function to a
civil pretrial hearing, preliminary hearing standards in criminal cases are typically less rigorous than
their civil counterparts. The typical standard for a preliminary hearing simply requires proof of
"probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the arrested person has
committed it." See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a); 18 U.S.C. § 3060(a) (2000). By contrast, in a civil
preliminary injunction hearing, the court must find that the party seeking relief is "likely to prevail on
the merits." Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004). Commentators have observed the anomaly of
these standards, which permit adverse action against criminal defendants on less evidence than would be
required to issue preliminary relief in a civil case. See, e.g., Albert Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial
Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 519
(1986) (observing that a probable cause standard requires "less evidence than [federal courts] would
require before issuing preliminary injunctions in civil cases").
133. See infra Subsection II.B.1.
134. See 4 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 11, § 14.2(b) (noting that over the federal system as
a whole, "preliminary hearings are held in roughly 15-18% of the criminal prosecutions filed in district
court").
135. Preliminary examinations on the state level generally are made available to defendants
charged by the prosecutor but not to those charged by the grand jury. Grand jury indictment may be used
in state systems either for a set category of offenses, see, e.g., R.I. CONST., art. 1, § 7 (requiring a grand
jury indictment for crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment), or at the prosecutor's discretion,
see, e.g., Hawkins v. Superior Court, 586 P.2d 916, 922 (Cal. 1978) (addressing a constitutional
challenge to a state criminal system under which the prosecutor had "unfettered discretion to choose
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defendant is indeed "processed" through the criminal justice system, he has no
constitutional right to the kind of process designed to ensure that there is a valid
basis for the criminal charges on which he may be arrested, detained, and
suspended from employment until he is ultimately tried. This is the due process
"gap" addressed in this Article.
Below, the Article turns to the Supreme Court doctrines that create this
seemingly anomalous result. While the protections that surround the criminal
trial are familiar principles-such concepts as the presumption of innocence,
the right to counsel, and the reasonable doubt standard-the procedural rules
that govern the pretrial criminal process are more arcane. There are two key
due process doctrines to understand: one doctrine establishes that there is no
constitutional right to an adversary pretrial hearing to test the basis for criminal
charges,1 36 while the other grants preclusive legal effect to the grand jury's
indictment for pretrial purposes. 37 Together, these doctrines operate not only to
deny criminal defendants due process hearing rights, but also to devalue those
protections offered by statutory pretrial procedure schemes.
1. Rejecting Due Process Rights in Pretrial Criminal Proceedings
The due process rules that govern pretrial criminal proceedings stem from
two seminal due process rulings issued over a half-century apart. The first is the
Supreme Court's 1913 decision in Lem Woon v. Oregon, in which the Court
held that a defendant has no due process right to a preliminary hearing at the
outset of a criminal case to test the validity of the government's charges.13' The
second is its 1975 decision in Gerstein v. Pugh, in which the Court applied the
same due process principle to pretrial detention, holding that a criminal
defendant constitutionally may be held in prison before trial without any
adversary hearing to test the validity of the charges on which he is detained.
139
Both cases remain important precedents.
At the time Lem Woon was decided, screening of criminal charges in state
criminal systems was commonly provided by holding a preliminary hearing to
review a prosecutor's charges. 140 Lem Woon presented the question whether
which defendants will be charged by indictment rather than information"). See generally 4 CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, supra note 1I, § 14.2(d) & n.48 (stating that in most state systems, indicted defendants are
not entitled to preliminary hearings).
136. See infra Subsection l.B.1.
137. See infra Subsection II.B.2.
138. 229U.S. 586(1913).
139. 420 U.S. 103, 120-25 (1975).
140. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (noting the existing state practice in
criminal cases to proceed "by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, certifying
to the probable guilt of the defendant"). Preliminary hearings were also used in the federal system to
review criminal charges following the defendant's arrest and prior to the submission of his case to the
grand jury. See 4 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 11, § 14.2(b) (reasoning that because grand juries
were not in constant session, the preliminary hearing served "to ensure that a person was not held in
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such hearings were constitutionally required as a matter of due process. While
the procedures for a preliminary hearing do not approach the formality of a
criminal trial, at the same time, the procedure reflects the basic elements of the
conventional due process model: the defendant receives notice, is entitled to
participate, and receives a ruling from a neutral decision-maker based on the
evidence presented. 14 1 The preliminary hearing thus might be thought to inject
an element of procedural due process in the initial stages of a criminal case.142
Despite the historic pedigree of the preliminary hearing, 143 the Supreme Court
held in Lem Woon that due process does not require a preliminary hearing.1
44
While the reasoning of Lem Woon is both sparse and questionable, 145 it
might be defensible as a principle in a case in which no consequences flow
from the criminal charges, other than to initiate a criminal prosecution. After
custody, or subjected to the continued burdens associated with release on bail, without a fairly prompt
prosecutorial showing of probable cause").
141. See generally 1 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 9, § 85 (noting that while it is
far less formal than a trial, a preliminary examination in its modem incarnation is a judicial proceeding
attended by a number of trial-type procedural rights, such as the right to counsel, the right to call
witnesses, the right to cross-examine the government's witnesses, the right to a neutral decision maker,
and the right to appeal); id. (noting that at the preliminary hearing, the magistrate stands between the
parties "not as partisan, but as judge," and that "[i]n subject and function, the hearing is judicial"
(quoting Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1942))).
142. Indeed, recognizing the value to the defendant of such adversary proceedings, the Supreme
Court later held that when a state provides for an adversary preliminary hearing, the Sixth Amendment
guarantees a right to counsel at that hearing. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1970).
143. See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538 (noting that the preliminary examination is an "ancient
proceeding at common law").
144. Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 590 (1913).
145. In Lem Woon, the due process analysis consisted of a single paragraph, in which the Court
reasoned that if due process does not require grand jury indictment, as it had earlier held in Hurtado v.
California, "we are unable to see upon what theory" states may be required to provide preliminary
examinations. Id. at 590. This rationale, however, is difficult to square with Hurtado itself. There the
Court was willing to dispense with the screening function served by grand jury indictment precisely
because the state had adopted a scheme that used preliminary hearings at which the magistrate judge
"certifqied] to the probable guilt of the defendant, with the right on his part to the aid of counsel, and to
the cross-examination of the witnesses produced for the prosecution." Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538.
Providing for preliminary hearings in lieu of grand jury indictment, the Hurtado Court emphasized,
"carefully considers and guards the substantial interest of the prisoner" and is thus a permissible method
of initiating criminal charges. Id. at 538. As this makes clear, the Hurtado decision did not hold that
there is no due process right to pretrial review of criminal charges, but rather that due process can be
satisfied by providing for pretrial review through a preliminary hearing. This reading is confirmed in
later Court decisions. See, e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430-31 (1994) (stating that the
Hurtado Court allowed the state to dispense with the "safeguards of common-law procedure" because it
provided an alternative procedure "with nearly the same protection as the abrogated common-law grand
jury procedure"); see also id. at 436 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The deprivation of property without
observing (or providing a reasonable substitute for) an important traditional procedure for enforcing
state-prescribed limits upon such deprivation violates the Due Process Clause."). Commentators
similarly interpret the Hurtado decision. See, e.g., Israel, supra note 12, at 345 ("In adopting
[preliminary hearings], the legislature had obviously taken account of the interest of the individual in not
being put through the burden of a trial where the state lacked a legitimate grounding for prosecution. It
simply had used an alternative to grand jury review to protect that interest."). Despite its questionable
constitutional analysis, the Lem Woon decision has proved durable. See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510
U.S. 266, 282 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that the Constitution generally requires "no
pretrial hearing on the sufficiency of the charges").
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all, charges alone do not generally give rise to due process hearing rights, even
though they may damage the defendant's reputation. 146 A litigant who faces
government fraud charges in a civil case, for example, has no constitutional
right to a pretrial hearing to challenge their factual basis unless the government
seeks a pretrial order that would affect his property rights. 147 But in Gerstein,
the Court extended the same principle to a case in which granting a preliminary
hearing would have seemed reasonable-when the criminal charges were used
not simply to initiate the case but also to justify detaining the defendant in
prison for an extended period pending trial.
148
It was in Gerstein--decided in 1975, during the height of the Court's
enthusiasm for procedural due process in civil contexts 149-that the Supreme
Court expressly articulated a separate due process principle for pretrial criminal
proceedings. 50 Leading up to Gerstein, the Court had issued a series of due
process decisions applying notice-and-hearing principles not only in newer
administrative settings' 5 1 but also to phases of civil cases historically treated as
nonadversary proceedings.152 In Gerstein, however, the Court drew the line at
extending such notice-and-hearing rights to pretrial proceedings in criminal
cases. This ruling reflected a departure from the clear trend of the Court's
146. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (rejecting the proposition that "reputation
alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as employment, is either 'liberty' or 'property' by
itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause").
147. Id. On the other hand, one might reasonably argue that criminal charges are sufficiently grave
in the obloquy and disruption they cause that such charges alone should give rise to "liberty" interests
protected by due process. See, e.g., Albright, 510 U.S. at 296 (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that "an
official accusation of serious crime has a direct impact on a range of identified liberty interests"
protected by due process); cf FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b) (imposing a heightened pleading standard on civil
fraud claims, which must be pled with "particularity").
148. Under the state procedures challenged in Gerstein, criminal defendants arrested without a
warrant could be detained in prison for extended periods without judicial review of the factual basis for
the criminal charges, so long as the prosecutor signed the criminal charges. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103, 106 (1975) (describing state criminal procedure under which "a person charged by
information could be detained for a substantial period solely on the decision of a prosecutor").
149. Gerstein was issued within five years after the Court's rulings that procedural due process
requires notice and hearing in a wide variety of settings, extending to such varied governmental
deprivations as the revocation of parole and probation, the pretrial seizure of household goods in a civil
case, the suspension of public school students, the garnishment of bank accounts, and the termination of
welfare benefits. See infra sources cited in notes 151 and 152.
150. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125 n.27.
151. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (applying procedural due process to require
a pre-deprivation hearing for the suspension of a student from public school); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535, 541-42 (1971) (applying procedural due process to require a pre-deprivation hearing for the
suspension of a driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970) (applying procedural due
process to require a pre-deprivation hearing for the termination of welfare benefits).
152. See, e.g., N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606-07 (1975) (applying
procedural due process to require a pre-deprivation hearing for the garnishment of bank account);
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82 (1973) (applying procedural due process to require
preliminary and final hearings for probation revocation); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972)
(applying procedural due process to require a pre-deprivation hearing for a replevin order seizing
household goods pending trial on repossession claims); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485-86
(1972) (applying procedural due process to require preliminary and final hearings for parole revocation).
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earlier due process decisions.
The Gerstein suspects were already safely in custody, and one could easily
have concluded-as did the district court and the court of appeals 13-that
providing for participation by the accused in a post-arrest probable cause
hearing could enhance the accuracy of this screening, the goal of due
process.154 The Supreme Court did not agree. Rejecting its civil due process
precedents as "inapposite and irrelevant,"' 155 the Court held that the defendant's
protection in the pretrial process is limited to the Fourth Amendment
requirement that a neutral judicial official find probable cause to support the
criminal charges.156 This judicial screening, it held, may be conducted without
the presence of the accused. 157 It is this ex parte Fourth Amendment procedure,
rather than the notice-and-hearing requirement of procedural due process, that
provides the only process "due" to the defendant to support pretrial
detention. 158
Under Lem Woon and Gerstein, a criminal defendant has no constitutional
right to an adversary preliminary hearing to review the merit of criminal
charges, even if he will suffer deprivations of liberty or property waiting for
trial. Instead, he has only a limited Fourth Amendment right to judicial review
in a hearing that may be closed to the defendant himself-a fundamental
departure from the participatory model of due process in civil settings.,
5
Equally important, this limited constitutional protection is undermined by
another legal principle lurking in Gerstein's footnotes: judicial review to screen
the basis for the criminal charges need not be conducted at all when the grand
jury has indicted. 160
153. See Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778, 787 (5th Cir. 1973), ajfd in part and rev'd in part sub
nom. Gerstein, 420 U.S. 103 (applying the Fuentes line of decisions to conclude that due process
requires an adversary preliminary hearing to review probable cause to detain criminal defendants).
154. See, e.g., Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (describing the "two central
concerns of procedural due process" to prevent unjustified governmental deprivations and to promote
participation in decision-making by affected individuals); Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 81 ("When a person has
an opportunity to speak up in his own defense, and when the State must listen to what he has to say,
substantively unfair and simply mistaken deprivations of property interests can be prevented.").
155. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125 n.27.
156. Id. at 126 (holding that that the Fourth Amendment requires a timely "judicial" determination
of probable cause as a prerequisite to detention).
157. Id. at 120 ("Probable cause can be determined reliably without an adversary hearing.").
158. Id. at 125 n.27 ("The Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly for the criminal justice
system, and its balance between individual and public interests has always been thought to define the
'process that is due' for seizures of person or property in criminal cases, including the detention of
suspects pending trial.").
159. Seesupra Part I.
160. In Gerstein, the Court revealed in dicta that its Fourth Amendment framework, requiring that a
judge independently review criminal charges for probable cause, does not apply at all when the
defendant has been charged by the grand jury rather than by the prosecutor. Instead, the grand jury's
indictment "conclusively determines the existence of probable cause." Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 117 n.19.
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2. Allowing Grand Jury Indictment To Displace Pretrial Judicial Review
Grand jury indictment is, of course, one method of charging criminal
offenses; the other is to allow the prosecutor to issue an "information," criminal
charges asserted by the prosecutor alone without the approval of panel of
citizen grand jurors. 16 1 Grand jury indictment is the predominant method of
charging in the federal criminal system, in which it is constitutionally required
for all serious offenses,' 62 while grand jury indictments are selectively used in
the states, which are free to design their own charging systems. 163 When the
grand jury is used, it reviews the prosecutor's proposed criminal charges in a
secret proceeding in which no rules of evidence apply and from which the
defendant is entirely excluded. 164 The grand jury is, of course, the very
antithesis of modem adversary hearing procedures.
The influence of grand jury doctrine in retarding the defendant's procedural
rights in the pretrial criminal process cannot be overstated. It is not simply that
the defendant lacks procedural rights in the grand jury process (although this is
certainly true). More than this, under governing doctrine, the mere fact that the
grand jury has indicted is also used to deprive the defendant of procedural
rights that would otherwise attach outside of the grand jury, both as a statutory
and constitutional matter. This result flows from the constitutional principle,
often traced to the Supreme Court's 1932 decision in Exparte United States,
165
that grand jury indictment is the legal equivalent of judicial review.' 66 When
161. See I CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 11, § 1.3(n) ("Like the indictment, the information is
a charging instrument which replaces the complaint, but it is issued by the prosecutor rather than the
grand jury.").
162. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury .... ").
163. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535-36 (1884) (holding that the Fifth Amendment
requirement for jury indictment is not applicable to state criminal proceedings). As a result of Hurtado,
grand jury indictment is required in the federal system only by virtue of the explicit grand jury clause in
the Fifth Amendment, and not by due process. The states are free to dispense with grand jury indictment
as a method of criminal accusation, and many states have done so, either in whole or in part. See
generally SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:5 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter
GRAND JURY LAW] (describing state grand jury reforms at the end of the nineteenth century). The
typical state charging procedure uses prosecutorial information combined with preliminary hearings, but
many states reserve grand jury indictment as an alternative charging method. See, e.g., id.; 1 CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, supra note II, § 1.3(m) ("In a majority of the states, the prosecution is now allowed to
proceed either by grand jury indictment or by information at its option.").
164. See generally Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 25 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(contrasting adversary preliminary hearings with grand jury proceedings, in which counsel for the
accused "cannot attend... even though witnesses, including the person eventually charged, may be
interrogated in secret session"); Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 203 (1951) (Reed,
J., concurring) (emphasizing that persons under grand jury investigation "have no right to notice by and
hearing before a grand jury; only a right to defend the charge at trial"); GRAND JURY LAW, supra note
163, § 1:1.
165. 287 U.S. 241 (1932).
166. Id. at 250 ("[T]he finding of an indictment, fair upon its face, by a properly constituted grand
jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause for the purpose of holding the accused to
answer.").
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the grand jury indicts, the validity of the criminal charges is conclusively
established for all pretrial purposes.' 
67
This far-reaching doctrine effectively forecloses any pretrial judicial review
of the factual basis for the government's criminal charge (whether for purposes
of arrest, detention, or otherwise) when the prosecutor obtains the grand jury's
approval for criminal charges. 168 Following indictment, the judge has no
discretion to deny an arrest warrant. 169 There is no probable cause hearing,
there is no preliminary hearing, and the ground has been laid both for pretrial
detention and government suspension.' 70 This occurs because the issue of
"probable cause"-which would otherwise require a judge's independent
review-is foreclosed by the grand jury's decision to indict.'71 This is a curious
rule when one considers the grand jury's "process."' 17 2
The grand jury's nonparticipatory process could not be farther from the
notice-and-hearing model embodied in a conventional understanding of due
process. Equally important, under normal rules about judicial qualifications
(whether for due process or Fourth Amendment purposes), the grand jury is not
a body that should qualify to make judicial judgments. 173 It is not simply that
the grand jury engages in a one-sided proceeding dominated by the prosecutor
(although this criticism is more than fair). 174 Equally important, within the legal
167. See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950) (stating that when
a grand jury issues an indictment, this is a conclusive determination that there is "probable cause to
believe [the defendant] is guilty," and "[a]s a result the defendant can be arrested and held for trial").
168. See generally Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 50-53 (2004) (noting that a grand jury indictment streamlines pretrial criminal
procedures by providing a legally conclusive determination of probable cause that eliminates the need
for further review procedures).
169. See Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. at 250 (holding that a grand jury's "indictment, fair upon
its face... conclusively determines the existence of probable cause for the purpose of holding the
accused to answer").
170. See Kuckes, supra note 168.
171. See FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 241 (1988) (noting that a grand jury indictment establishes
"probable cause to believe that appellee had committed a felony" and thus justifies the defendant's
suspension from employment without a prior hearing); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19 (1975)
(stating that a grand jury indictment "conclusively determines the existence of probable cause" for the
purposes of arrest and detention); Sciortino v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132, 133 (2d Cir. 1967) (noting that a
grand jury indictment establishes probable cause and thus "eliminates the need for a preliminary
examination," which would be an "empty ritual"). This substitution doctrine is particularly important in
the federal system, in which most criminal cases proceed by indictment because of the Fifth Amendment
requirement of grand jury indictment for all serious crimes. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. While state
systems vary, many states also allow or require grand jury indictment for specified cases. See generally
4 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 11, § 14.2(c) ("Eighteen states, as in the federal system, require
prosecution by indictment (unless waived) for all felonies."); id. § 14.2(d) ("Almost two-thirds of the
states permit felony prosecutions to be brought either information or indictment .... ").
172. The only rationale offered by the Court for allowing grand jury indictments to satisfy Gerstein
requirements was the grand jury's "relationship to the courts and its historical role of protecting
individuals from unjust prosecution." Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 1l7 n. 19.
173. See, e.g., id. at 112 (noting that the Fourth Amendment requires a determination by a "neutral
and detached magistrate" (citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948))).
174. See, e.g., Leonard B. Boudin, The Federal Grand Jury, 61 GEO. L.J. 1, 35 (1972) (stating that
the grand jury is an "arm of the state, more powerful than ever before, serving the ends of the
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process the grand jury serves in an accusatory role as part of a law enforcement
function. 175 If, like prosecutors, grand jurors charge and investigate crimes,
they should be no more qualified than prosecutors to judge the merit of their
own charges.176 Yet the Court has held that there is no constitutional right to a
judicial hearing, adversary or otherwise, to test the government's charges when
the grand jury indicts. 177
Standing alone, the idea that grand jury indictment should suffice for
issuing an arrest warrant (the narrow question in Ex parte United States) is not
unreasonable. The government must be able to move swiftly to apprehend
suspected wrongdoers and bring them to justice, and treating grand jury
indictments as judicial furthers this purpose. 178 The problem arises, however,
when this doctrine is combined with the general lack of due process protections
in the criminal model. Arresting a defendant on the strength of a grand jury
indictment would not matter if a criminal defendant retained ordinary due
process rights thereafter (for example, to a post-arrest hearing to support his
detention, his suspension from government employment, the freezing of his
bank account, or other, nonphysical restrictions on his liberty). In such a
regime, the defendant would get some meaningful opportunity for a hearing
designed to ensure that the evidence justifies the considerable deprivations he
will suffer during the criminal process. But the Supreme Court has made clear
that preliminary hearings are not required. 
179
Grand jury doctrine also has another effect in depressing the defendant's
pretrial rights that is slightly more subtle. Whether in criminal or civil settings,
of course, due process simply establishes the floor for permissible procedural
protections; state and federal governments are free to adopt additional
prosecution"); William J. Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174, 174
(1973) ("Today, the grand jury is the total captive of the prosecutor who, if he is candid, will concede
that he can indict anybody, at any time, for almost anything, before any grand jury.").
175. See Williams v. United States, 504 U.S. 36, 51 (1992) (stating that the grand jury is an
"accusatory" body); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 687 (1972) (emphasizing the grand jury's
"important role in fair and effective law enforcement").
176. See, e.g., Charles A. Thompson, The Fourth Amendment Function of the Grand Jury, 37 OHIO
ST. L.J. 727, 743 (1976) (arguing that the grand jury's dependence on the prosecutor precludes it from
making a neutral and detached judgment to satisfy the Fourth Amendment); Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 117
(holding that prosecutor's "responsibility to law enforcement is inconsistent with the constitutional role
of neutral and detached magistrate").
177. See, e.g., Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129 (1997) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
probable cause requirement to support an arrest "may be satisfied by an indictment returned by a grand
jury, but not by the mere filing of criminal charges in an unswom information signed by the
prosecutor").
178. Even under normal due process rules, the need for secrecy to effect the defendant's arrest
would qualify as an exigent circumstance obviating the need for prior notice. See infra note 304.
179. See, e.g., Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 119 (noting that a "judicial hearing is not prerequisite to
prosecution by information"); Rivera v. Virgin Islands, 375 F.2d 988, 990 (3d Cir. 1967) (noting that the
provision of a preliminary hearing is "a mere procedural right which is not within the constitutional
concept of due process"); cf. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 8 (1970) ("The preliminary hearing is
not a required step in an Alabama prosecution.").
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protections by statute. While the Supreme Court in Lem Woon declined to give
the preliminary hearing constitutional status,18  many systems (including the
federal system) have adopted preliminary hearings as a matter of statute or
rule. 18 1 On paper, preliminary hearings look like reasonable due process
hearings: the defendant is present, has a right to counsel and to call or cross-
examine witnesses, and an independent judicial official reviews the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the criminal charges.' 
82
The Catch-22 created by grand jury indictment is that indicted defendants
do not get preliminary hearings.' 83 Although this is not a necessary rule, it
follows logically from the principle of grand jury equivalency. If one accepts
the premise that the grand jury's indictment is equivalent to a judicial probable
cause finding, there is no need to have a judge find probable cause if the grand
jury has already made that determination. On this rationale, courts have
concluded that statutory rights to a preliminary hearing, like Fourth
Amendment rights, should evaporate once the grand jury indicts. 184
Some common themes emerge from the due process rules that set the
constitutional floor for the screening mechanisms in the pretrial criminal
process (arrest, accusation, preliminary hearing, and pretrial detention).185 Little
180. See Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913) (holding that preliminary hearings are not
required by due process).
181. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1 (describing preliminary hearing procedures); 1 CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, supra note 11, § 1.3(l) ("All but a few of our fifty-two jurisdictions grant the felony
defendant a right to a preliminary hearing, to be held within a specified period .... ").
182. See generally 1 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 11, § 14.1 (stating that the preliminary
hearing is an "open and adversary hearing" before a magistrate at which the prosecution must establish
that there is sufficient evidence supporting its charge); id. § 14.4 (noting that at a preliminary hearing,
the defendant has procedural rights typically including the right to counsel, the right to cross-examine
the prosecution's witnesses, and the right to call witnesses).
183. See 18 U.S.C. § 3060(e) (stating that no preliminary examination is held if a grand jury
indictment is returned); United States v. Simon, 510 F. Supp. 232, 235 (E.D. Pa. 1981) ("Once a federal
grand jury has indicted a defendant, probable cause is established, and the defendant is no longer entitled
to a preliminary hearing."); FED. R. CRiM. P. 5(c) (stating that the "preliminary examination shall not be
held if the defendant is indicted"); I CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 11, § 1.3(l) ("In almost all
jurisdictions, if the prosecutor obtains a grand jury indictment prior to the scheduled preliminary
hearing, the preliminary hearing will not be held ... ").
184. See, e.g., United States v. Aranda-Hernandez, 95 F.3d 977, 980 (10th Cir. 1996) ("The judicial
determination of probable cause may be in the form of a preliminary examination or it may be in the
form of an indictment; both are not required."); Sciortino v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132, 133 (2d Cir. 1967)
(emphasizing that following a grand jury indictment, which establishes probable cause, a preliminary
examination would be an "empty ritual"); cf People v. Franklin, 398 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (111. App. Ct.
1980) (concluding that both grand jury indictment and a preliminary examination "serve the function of
determining probable cause and to require a repetition of this function by initiating post-indictment
preliminary hearings would be an empty formality").
185. See, e.g., I CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 11, § 1.4(0 (noting that "[t]he goal of
minimizing the risk of erroneous accusations is advanced primarily through the various screening
procedures of the criminal justice process," including arrest, post-arrest review before the magistrate,
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constitutional value is placed on the participation of the citizen himself in
decision-making, although his interests are directly at stake.' 86 Apart from the
Fifth Amendment right to grand jury indictment (which has no procedural
content) 187 and the Fourth Amendment's "probable cause" requirement (which
has very little), 188 the Due Process Clause does not grant a criminal defendant
any independent right to adversary proceedings to test the factual basis for
criminal charges in advance of trial,189 even if those charges are used to justify
such coercive pretrial measures as detaining the defendant in prison, seizing his
property before trial, or limiting his right to travel. 190
This minimal constitutional floor has allowed the development of criminal
pretrial statutes that grant statutory hearing rights to some defendants, withhold
them from others, and generally fail to instill confidence that pretrial hearing
procedures adequately guard against the risk of erroneous deprivations.'91 State
pretrial criminal systems can seem arbitrary. One defendant might be arrested
and detained on the grand jury's secret probable cause review, while another
accused of the same offense but charged by the prosecutor might have probable
cause determined at a full adversary preliminary hearing before a judge. 192 The
preliminary hearings, and grand jury review).
186. There are, of course, circumstances in criminal proceedings when providing notice to the
accused will thwart the very purpose of the process (for example, when notice would allow the
defendant to flee). But the Court has declined to provide for participatory rights even in circumstances
when providing notice to the defendant would not threaten the integrity of the judicial process. See, e.g.,
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 127 (1975) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[T]his case does not involve an
initial arrest, but rather the continuing incarceration of a presumptively innocent person."); Pugh v.
Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778, 784 (5th Cir. 1973), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103 ("Where the State already has the defendant in custody it is not in jeopardy of losing him
before a magistrate can rule on probable cause.").
187. The Supreme Court has consistently refused to read into the Fifth Amendment's grand jury
indictment clause any particular procedural guarantees, adversary or otherwise. See Williams v. United
States, 504 U.S. 36, 53 (1992) (rejecting a rule that would have required the prosecutor to present
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956) (refusing to
impose hearsay rules on grand jury proceedings, as the grand jury's work has never been "hampered by
rigid procedural or evidential rules").
188. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120-22 (stating that the defendant has neither the right to adversary
procedures nor the right to assistance of counsel for the court's Fourth Amendment probable cause
review).
189. See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 282 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that the Bill
of Rights does not require a "pretrial hearing to weigh evidence according to a given standard," but
simply requires "a grand jury indictment and a speedy trial where a petit jury can determine whether the
charges are true").
190. See, e.g., United States v. Contreras, 776 F.2d 51, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1985) (reasoning that
because an "indictment returned by a duly constituted and unbiased grand jury satisfies the Constitution
as to the existence of probable cause that the defendant committed the crimes enumerated therein," the
court will not require the government to present evidence that criminal conduct actually occurred).
191. See, e.g., N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 608 (1975) (concluding, with
respect to the temporary garnishment of commercial bank accounts, that the "probability of irreparable
injury ... is sufficiently great so that some procedures are necessary to guard against the risk of initial
error").
192. See, e.g., infra note 200 (discussing Hawkins v. Superior Court, 586 P.2d 916 (Cal. 1978),
superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 14.1).
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federal system, by contrast, is consistent but draconian. The adversary
preliminary hearing that exists on paper is illusory because it is infrequently
held; all serious cases proceed by indictment, which moots the defendant's
statutory right to have his charges reviewed by a judge.193 Clearly, due process
doctrine in criminal cases is very different than the comparatively solicitous
approach in civil cases, even though the stakes are higher.
Below, the Article explores some of the problematic consequences of
allowing different procedural due process doctrines to govern civil and criminal
cases.
Iii. THE PROBLEMATIC CONSEQUENCES OF COMPETING DOCTRINES OF CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS
The differing procedural standards reflected in the Supreme Court's
doctrines of civil and criminal due process create some problematic results. As
hinted at above, the absence of due process regulation of pretrial criminal
procedures permits radical differences in procedural protections for different
defendants, based simply on the fortuity of the charging method. Within the
criminal process, the divergent due process rules encourage irrational fact-
finding procedures and lead to unexplained procedural differences between the
pretrial and post-trial stages of a case. As between civil and criminal cases, the
irrationalities can be even greater. Here, the due process rules seem to exhibit
greater solicitude for the rights of convicted criminals than for the rights of
presumptively innocent defendants, and to provide a higher level of protection
for property rights in civil cases than for liberty interests in criminal
prosecutions. In parallel proceedings, the lower procedural protections on the
criminal side undermine the higher constitutional protections on the civil side.
All of these anomalous results can be traced to the Court's failure to integrate
its civil and criminal due process doctrines.
A. Disparities Within the Criminal Process
One evident problem tolerated by the criminal due process model is that
different criminal defendants may enjoy radically different pretrial procedural
rights, depending on the fortuity of the method the government used to charge
them with crimes. 94 Because the pretrial aspects of a criminal case are not
regulated by procedural due process, govemments are free to offer or withhold
193. See sources cited supra note 134. Commentators have observed the common practice of
federal prosecutors to "bypass" the preliminary hearing process by resorting to the nonadversary grand
jury process before the hearing can be held. See 4 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 11, § 14.2(b)
(discussing "bypass" practices of federal prosecutors).
194. See, e.g., Hawkins, 586 P.2d at 917-18 (noting the contrast between the "impressive array of
procedural rights" in a preliminary hearing and the "remarkable lack of even the most basic rights" in
the grand jury process).
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preliminary hearings across the board-or to give them to some defendants and
not others-without running afoul of the Constitution. 195 To conserve their
resources, both the federal and state governments reduce the number of
preliminary hearings by denying such hearings to defendants who have had
grand jury review (a practice which is constitutionally permissible).196
All federal felonies must proceed by indictment, so federal criminal
defendants rarely get preliminary hearings.' 97 On the state level, by contrast,
while preliminary hearings are widely available, 198 they are often selectively
denied to defendants who are charged by grand jury indictment (but given to
those who are charged by a prosecutor). 199 Not surprisingly, these arbitrary
differences create perceptions of unfairness. 200 Intuitively, it is hard to believe
that the ex parte review by citizens in the grand jury can possibly provide an
equal testing of the factual basis for criminal charges as an adversary hearing
before a judge, conducted by defense counsel. Yet the criminal due process
model treats these as legal equivalents.
Distinct but related disparities have resulted when the Court has confronted
the challenge of reconciling new types of pretrial criminal proceedings with the
traditional constitutional rules governing the pretrial process. Consider, for
example, what happens when the federal government seeks a defendant's
"preventative detention" before trial on grounds of danger to the community-a
mechanism unknown in traditional criminal procedure. 20 1 When this scheme
was adopted in the Bail Reform Act of 1984,202 the Supreme Court faced the
195. See, e.g., United States v. Shober, 489 F. Supp. 393, 401 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (holding that denying
preliminary hearings to indicted defendants violates neither due process nor equal protection).
196. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 417 A.2d 953, 962 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980) (holding that using an
"indictment-without-preliminary hearing procedure" furthers the State's interest in "obtaining a pretrial
determination of probable cause without unnecessarily taxing the State's limited criminal justice
administrative resources").
197. See sources cited supra note 134.
198. See I CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 11, § 1.4(c) ("Most states now use the adversary
preliminary hearing either in addition to, or a substitute for, the nonadversary screening by the grand
jury."); see, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975) (noting that adversary preliminary hearings
are the "procedure used in many States to determine whether the evidence justifies going to trial").
199. See supra note 135.
200. In one notable case, the California Supreme Court found a state-law equal protection violation
based on the "considerable disparity in the procedural rights" afforded in the State's pretrial criminal
process, depending on whether the defendant was charged by indictment or information. See Hawkins v.
Superior Court, 586 P.2d 916, 922 (Cal. 1978) (declaring that the "denial of a postindictment
preliminary hearing" deprived defendants of equal protection of the laws under the California
Constitution), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 14.1. The Hawkins
decision was later overturned by voter referendum.
201. Under traditional rules, a noncapital defendant's presumptive right to be released on bail could
be overridden if the court found the defendant would not appear at trial if released, or would threaten the
integrity of the trial by approaching witnesses. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1951). This scheme
changed dramatically in federal cases when, in 1984, Congress passed the Bail Reform Act,
authorizing the "preventative" detention of defendants charged with certain crimes, who might commit
crimes while on bail. See supra note 128.
202. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2000).
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due process problem how to reconcile this new form of detention with the
traditionally nonadversary pretrial criminal process. In effect, the Act imported
into the criminal context a type of detention for "dangerousness" that had
previously characterized limited civil contexts, such as wartime, immigration,
and involuntary commitment.2 0 3 In civil contexts, of course, such detention
gives rise to traditional due process notice-and-hearing rights.
20 4
To explain why the new federal detention scheme was procedurally fair, the
Court in United States v. Salerno emphasized the extensive adversary
protections extended to the defendant at the pretrial detention hearing to
determine his "dangerousness." 20 5 At the same time, not one Justice suggested
that due process required any adversary process with respect to the court's
determination that "probable cause" supported the charges, a separate statutory
requirement for detention. 20 6 The federal courts have repeatedly held, similarly,
that the grand jury's indictment conclusively establishes that probable cause
supports the charges and forecloses an evidentiary inquiry into this statutory
element.
20 7
203. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-27 (1979) (discussing the civil detention of
mentally unstable persons who present a danger to the public); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537-42
(1952) (discussing the civil detention of dangerous resident aliens pending deportation); Ludecke v.
Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 170-73 (1948) (discussing the civil detention of enemy aliens in time of war);
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) (discussing the civil detention of dangerous
resident aliens pending deportation). The closest prior analogy to the constitutional questions posed by
the Bail Reform Act was the Court's prior decision in Schall v. Martin, upholding the propriety of a state
law that provided for limited detention of juveniles during delinquency proceedings based on their
propensity to commit further crimes if released during the proceedings. See 467 U.S. 253 (1984). Such
delinquency proceedings are civil in nature. Id. at 257 n.4. The Court explicitly analogized to these civil
counterparts in upholding the propriety of the detention provisions of the Bail Reform Act. See United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987).
204. See, e.g., Addington, 441 U.S. at 425 ("This Court repeatedly has recognized that civil
commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process
protection.").
205. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 741 (emphasizing the "adversary hearing"); id. at 750 (emphasizing
the "full-blown adversary hearing"); id. at 751 (emphasizing the "procedures ... specifically designed to
further the accuracy of [the dangerousness] determination"); id. at 755 (emphasizing that detention is
imposed "after an adversary hearing").
206. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2000) (stating that a judicial officer must find "probable cause" to
believe that defendant committed a predicate offense). The Justices apparently thought it beyond
question that the grand jury indictment established this statutory element. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 764
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that "an indictment ... establishes that there is probable cause to
believe that an offense was committed, and that the defendant committed it").
207. See, e.g., United States v. Suppa, 799 F.2d 115, 118-19 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that for
purposes of detention hearing as elsewhere, "an indictment by a grand jury conclusively demonstrates
that probable cause exists to implicate a defendant in a crime"); United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d
702, 706 (7th Cir. 1986) (arguing that the court's probable cause finding to support preventative
detention "may be based solely on an indictment charging crimes"); United States v. Contreras, 776 F.2d
51, 54 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[W]e hold that a grand jury indictment cannot be undermined by an independent
judicial determination finding no probable cause in the context of a detention hearing."); United States
v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1477 (1 1th Cir. 1985) ("It is so well settled as to be beyond cavil that the
return of a true bill by a grand jury, resulting in indictment, conclusively demonstrates that probable
cause exists implicating a citizen in a crime."); United States v. Hazime, 762 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1985)
(affirming that "the indictment in this case.., is sufficient to establish probable cause that Hazime
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The net result of Salerno is that the defendant gets an impressive degree of
adversary protections for the traditionally civil predicate for preventative
detention (that the defendant's detention is needed to protect community
safety) 2°8 but no adversary protections at all for the traditionally criminal
predicate (that there is "probable cause" to believe the defendant committed the
crimes charged). 20 9 This ruling is particularly baffling, because under the
statutory scheme the mere fact of criminal charges may create a presumption
210that detention should be ordered. In Salerno, the Court announced a
procedural compromise that acknowledges the relevance of conventional civil
notice-and-hearing rules, yet applies the traditional deference to the grand
jury's nonadversary hearing process despite the inconsistency of these
doctrines.211
A final disparity within the criminal process relates to inconsistencies
between the hearing rights extended at the pre- and post-trial stages of a
criminal case. This due process gap was created when the Supreme Court
extended notice-and-hearing rules to criminal sentencing, while continuing to
take a cramped view of due process rights in the criminal pretrial process.
committed one or more of the charged offenses"). This understanding is also espoused by
commentators-that probable cause is conclusively established by the grand jury's nonadversary
indictment process and may not be reopened at the (otherwise) adversary bail hearing. See, e.g.,
Alschuler, supra note 132, at 518 (noting that "in most federal cases, only an ex parte, in camera
determination of probable cause by a grand jury (a body often dominated by a federal prosecutor) guards
against preventative incarceration of the innocent"). But see United States v. Cox, 635 F. Supp. 1047,
1052 (D. Kan. 1986) ("When dealing with as fundamental a right as personal liberty-the right to
remain free from detention until a judicial determination of guilt arrived at with all of the traditional
safeguards of a criminal trial-a heavier standard for establishing probable cause is required.").
208. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751-52 (emphasizing that at a preventative detention hearing,
detainees have a right to counsel, to testify in their own behalf, to present information by proffer or
otherwise, and to cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing; that the government's burden of
proof is clear and convincing evidence; that a judicial officer charged with determining whether
detention is warranted is guided by statutory factors and must include written findings of fact and of
reasons to support the detention; and that the law provides for immediate appellate review of the
detention decision).
209. As noted earlier, there is no adversary hearing on probable cause because the grand jury's
indictment conclusively establishes this statutory element. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 132, at 559
("Neither the [Bail Reform Act] nor any other federal law guarantees the defendant a hearing on whether
he has done anything wrong.").
210. Simply charging the defendant with certain crimes gives rise to a statutory presumption that
there is no set of conditions that will assure the safety of the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2000)
(providing that "[s]ubject to rebuttal by the person, it shall be presumed that no condition or
combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety
of the community if the judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to believe" that the person
committed any of the federal offenses specified in the Act, which include most serious drug crimes).
Whether the defendant committed the offense at all is also critical because regulatory detention based
purely on dangerousness is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997)
("A finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify
indefinite involuntary commitment.").
211. See Alschuler, supra note 132, at 517-18 ("One would imagine that, before imposing [the
burdens of pretrial detention], a civilized society would demand substantial preliminary evidence that a
defendant had committed a crime. One might imagine as well that this society would afford the
defendant at least an informal hearing on the issue. The United States, however, does not do so.").
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Modem determinate sentencing laws, such as the federal Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, depart from traditional sentencing practices by creating specific
legislative and administrative standards to guide judicial sentencing
decisions. 2 1 These reforms and their predecessors created pressure for due
process protections because of the evident parallel to administrative
entitlements, an area in which the Supreme Court has recognized extensive
procedural due process rights.2 13 The Court has resolved such issues, in part, by
applying notice-and-hearing rights in sentencing.21 4 At the same time, the Court
has continued to restrict due process hearing rights in pretrial proceedings.
Under these divergent due process doctrines, a convicted felon is entitled to
notice and hearing when, for example, the Court at sentencing is considering
215increasing a requested prison sentence by several months. Yet a
presumptively innocent criminal defendant has no comparable constitutional
right to an adversary hearing on the merit of the criminal charges before the
government may detain him in prison, potentially for lengthy periods, awaiting
his criminal trial.216 While the presumptive availability of bail might seem to
temper the risk that defendants will be held for lengthy periods without
meaningful adversary process, the data suggests that this confidence may be
misplaced.2 17
As these disparities reflect, rather than integrating its due process
approaches, the Court simply applies both the civil notice-and-hearing model of
due process (exemplified by Mathews) and the leaner criminal due process
model (exemplified by Gerstein) without acknowledging or reconciling the
contradiction between the two models.
212. See, e.g., Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 132 (1991) (stating that the Sentencing Reform
Act "revolutionized the manner in which district courts sentence persons convicted of federal crimes" by
adopting specific guidelines to govern the sentencing process). But see United States v. Booker 543 U.S.
220, 233-34 (2005) (striking down the mandatory application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
213. See, e.g., Burns, 501 U.S. at 147 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing that under the
Sentencing Reform Act, a defendant "enjoys an expectation subject to due process protection" that he
will be sentenced in accordance with the terms of the statute).
214. See sources cited supra note 109.
215. See Burns, 501 U.S. at 138 (holding that a district court must provide notice to defendant that
it is considering an upward departure from an applicable Guidelines sentencing range).
216. See supra Subsection II.B. 1.
217. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1355 n.5 (D.C. 1981) (Ferren, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The right to bail, of course, is often illusory .... [E]ven
when not constitutionally excessive, bail in fact may be set too high for the accused to afford.").
Professor Manns has written at length on the problem of pretrial detention:
Each year tens of thousands of criminal defendants face periods of pretrial detention that can
last weeks to months. Judges detain a small minority without bail because they are deemed a
flight risk or a danger to the community, and no other means may adequately ensure their
presence at trial. But the vast majority of detainees languish in detention primarily because
they are guilty of being too poor to meet bail.
Manns, supra note 113, at 1950.
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B. Disparities Between Criminal and Civil Cases
The Supreme Court's schizophrenic due process approach does not simply
distort the criminal process, as explored above, but also creates irrational
disparities between criminal and civil cases. The problem, of course, is that the
deprivations threatened by a civil case may resemble those in a criminal case.
Civil litigation, no less than criminal prosecutions, may present governmental
demands for pretrial measures such as asset freezes, cease and desist orders,
and even pretrial detention. Comparing the due process rules between civil and
criminal cases gives rise to the fair criticism that the pretrial protections in a
criminal case, in which the defendant's liberty may be at stake, are less than the
pretrial protections that attach to lesser deprivations in civil settings.2 18
Comparing civil and criminal rules on pretrial detention, for example, a
convicted defendant is constitutionally entitled to greater procedural protection
in civil proceedings that follow his successful conviction than in his underlying
criminal case. In Morrissey v. Brewer, applying the standard notice-and-hearing
due process model, the Court concluded that when the government seeks to
revoke a convicted defendant's parole-a proceeding that is civil in nature-
the defendant is constitutionally entitled to a hearing immediately following his
arrest to review the factual basis to justify recommitting him to prison pending
a fuller hearing.219 The Court explained that this initial inquiry "should be seen
as in the nature of a 'preliminary hearing' to determine whether there is
probable cause or reasonable grounds" to support the government's charges.
220
This ruling creates an ironic juxtaposition. A parole violator-that is, a
defendant who has been proven guilty-has a constitutional right to a
"preliminary hearing" on the question whether he violated the terms of his
criminal sentence. Yet due process does not extend the same right to a
preliminary hearing to the defendant-who is presumptively innocent-before
conviction. 221 It is hard to understand why the same principles of accuracy and
fairness that compel the Court to recognize the value of a preliminary adversary
hearing in a parole revocation case would not compel the same procedure in a
criminal case.222
218. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 132, at 567 ("To imprison defendants on the basis of
substantially less evidence than would be required to justify interim relief in a civil case... is
unconscionable.").
219. 408 U.S. 471, 485-88 (1972). Indeed, the Supreme Court subsequently held that a right to
counsel may also attach in certain parole revocation cases. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786-
87 (1973) (recognizing that "the effectiveness of the rights guaranteed by Morrissey may in some
circumstances depend on the use of skills which the probationer or parolee is unlikely to possess").
220. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485 ("[Dlue process would seem to require some minimal inquiry be
conducted at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest and as promptly as
convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources are still available.").
221. See supra Subsection II.B.I.
222. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) ("The
function of legal process, as that concept is embodied in the Constitution, and in the realm of
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These disparities become even more striking when one considers the
difference between the lack of pretrial protections in criminal litigation
affecting liberty interests and the solicitous procedural rules in civil litigation
involving property rights. Civil litigation cases involving the temporary seizure
of private property, like Fuentes v. Shevin 223 or United States v. James Daniel
Good Real Property,224 again highlight the contradiction between these two
models of due process. Following the defendant's conviction on drug charges
in James Daniel Good Real Property, the government initiated a civil
proceeding seeking forfeiture of the defendant's house allegedly used in his
drug crimes. As an initial step in the civil litigation, the government obtained a
seizure order in an ex parte proceeding. Invoking the civil due process cases,
the defendant complained that this procedure violated his due process right to
notice and a hearing before the pretrial seizure of his property. The Supreme
Court agreed. 225 Rejecting the restrictive criminal due process approach, which
would have required no adversary process to justify the seizure order, the Court
instead applied traditional notice-and-hearing principles.
226
Consider the result of this ruling: at his criminal trial the defendant, who is
presumed innocent, can himself be detained pending trial on the strength of an
ex parte determination of probable cause-made without his participation
based on evidence unknown to him. Yet in the civil trial that follows, the now-
convicted criminal can insist on a right to know and refute the evidence
supporting the temporary seizure of property allegedly used in his crimes. The
irony was not lost on Chief Justice Rehnquist, who decried it "paradoxical
indeed" to allow ex parte procedures to suffice for purposes of holding a
criminal defendant pending trial, but not for holding his property in a collateral
civil proceeding that follows.
227
Perhaps the high-water mark of the civil-criminal split, however, is
factfinding, is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions.").
223. 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972).
224. 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
225. See id. at 53 ("The right to prior notice and a hearing is central to the Constitution's command
of due process."); id. at 62 ("Unless exigent circumstances are present, the Due Process Clause requires
the Government to afford notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before seizing real property
subject to civil forfeiture.").
226. Id. at 50-54 (rejecting the analogy to Gerstein and applying the due process model of
Mathews).
227. See id. at 67-68 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("It is paradoxical indeed to hold that a criminal
defendant can be temporarily deprived of liberty on the basis of an ex parte probable-cause
determination, yet [a civil defendant] cannot be temporarily deprived of property on the same basis.").
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued similarly in a substantive due process case that "it would be odd to
conclude that the Government may not restrain property, such as the home and apartment in
respondent's possession, based on a finding of probable cause, when we have held that ... the
Government may restrain persons where there is a finding of probable cause to believe that the accused
has committed a serious offense." United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 615-16 (1989) (finding no
due process bar to pretrial orders seizing a defendant's assets allegedly used in a crime, even if the
defendant needs the assets to pay for his defense).
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exhibited in the early due process decisions in Fuentes and Gerstein. In
Fuentes, the Supreme Court held that a civil defendant may not be temporarily
deprived of the continued possession of a partially paid oven and stereo system,
valued at $500, without prior notice and an opportunity for a judicial hearing.228
Yet the Supreme Court, just three years later, rejected attempts by the lower
courts to impose comparable notice-and-hearing rights in criminal cases. In
Gerstein, the Court held that no adversary procedures are constitutionally
required to justify the pretrial detention of the criminal defendant, potentially
229for significant periods. It is no wonder that Justice Stewart, writing
separately in Gerstein, objected to the majority's premise that "the Constitution
extends less procedural protection to an imprisoned human being than is
required to test the propriety of garnishing a commercial bank account,. . . the
custody of a refrigerator .... the temporary suspension of a public school
student .... or the suspension of a driver's license."
230
Finally, criminal due process doctrines also have a pernicious effect insofar
as they spill over to undermine due process protections in civil as well as
criminal cases. Under the grand jury equivalency doctrine, for example, the
defendant's indictment may be used to truncate normal hearing procedures not
only in his criminal prosecution, but also in related civil proceedings. Under
normal due process rules, loss of a government entitlement (such as
government employment, or eligibility forgovernment contract awards) gives
rise to the due process right to notice and a hearing, even with respect to
interim steps such as suspension. 23 1 But when suspension is sought on the
ground that a government employee or government contractor has been
indicted, the same due process rules do not apply.232 Instead, the grand jury's
228. See Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 96 ("We hold that the Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin
provisions work a deprivation of property without due process of law insofar as they deny the right to a
prior opportunity to be heard before chattels are taken from their possessor.").
229. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 123 (1975) ("conclud[ing] that the Constitution does not
require an adversary determination of probable cause" to support the defendant's pretrial detention).
230. Id. at 127 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also. e.g., Pugh v. Rainwater, 483
F.2d 778, 787 (5th Cir. 1973) ("Incarceration of an untried defendant for up to a month without any
scrutiny by a judicial officer of the basis for this incarceration is far more odious to a sense of justice
than the temporary deprivation of property without a hearing. Yet the Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that such deprivations of property are impermissible."), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom.
Gerstein, 420 U.S. 103. In Fuentes, the Court recognized the slippery-slope problem of expanding
pretrial rights in civil cases without threatening the traditionally ex parte nature of criminal pretrial
proceedings. See Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 93 n.30 ("[Olur decision today in no way implies that there must
be an opportunity for an adversary hearing before a search warrant is issued.").
231. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928-29 (1997) (noting that the Court has held that
"public employees who can be discharged only for cause have a constitutionally protected property
interest in their tenure and cannot be fired without due process"); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532, 545 (1985) (holding that a public employee dismissable only for cause was entitled under
procedural due process to a pre-termination hearing as an "initial check against mistaken decisions,"
with a more extensive hearing to follow).
232. See, e.g., Debarment and Suspension Procedures, 48 C.F.R. ch. 2, app. H-102 (2001) ("In a
suspension action based upon an indictment,.., there will be no fact-[finding] proceeding concerning
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indictment conclusively establishes that there are reasonable grounds for
suspension. Even though a defendant targeted for suspension would ordinarily
be entitled by due process to test the facts in a judicial hearing, 233 the grand
jury's secret indictment process suffices. The theory, as expressed by the
Supreme Court in FDIC v. Mallen, is that grand jury charges provide
"substantial assurance that the deprivation is not baseless or unwarranted., 234
The logic of cases like Mallen is not hard to understand. If one accepts the
premise that adversary rights should not attach in the early stages of a criminal
case, applying a comparable rule in related civil settings makes sense. This is
Gerstein's race to the bottom. If grand jury indictment is sufficient, standing
alone, to provide a reliable factual basis for detaining a defendant in prison, it is
hard to see why grand jury indictment should not also be enough to suspend his
government employment, a lesser deprivation of rights. To grant adversary
review of the factual basis for criminal charges here would give an indicted
defendant greater rights in subsidiary civil suspension proceedings than in the
underlying criminal case.
On the other hand, if one examines the criminal due process model with a
critical eye, its logic is far from clear. The suspension cases highlight once
again the divergence between the standard notice-and-hearing model of due
process, which assumes that disclosure and participation by the party affected is
the most reliable means of fact-finding, and the criminal due process model,
which grants virtually exclusive power over fact-finding to a partisan
government prosecutor at the outset of a criminal case. The disconnect between
these due process doctrines is both problematic and influential.
In short, surveying the landscape of constitutional rulings on criminal
pretrial rights raises some basic questions. Why was the Supreme Court ready
to announce that a defendant has no due process right to pretrial screening of a
prosecutor's criminal charges when it is willing to recognize comparable
protections both for civil parties and agency litigants? More broadly, why
should the doctrines of procedural due process operate so differently in
criminal and civil cases? Below, the Article considers the rationales the Court
has offered to justify its distinctive model of criminal due process.
the matters alleged in the indictment.").
233. See, e.g., FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 244 (1988) (holding that an indicted defendant may
be suspended from government employment without a hearing because grand jury indictment
demonstrates that probable cause exists and therefore the "suspension is not arbitrary"); James A.
Merritt & Sons v. Marsh, 791 F.2d 328, 330-31 (1986) (holding that an indicted contractor may be
immediately suspended from further contract awards without a hearing because the grand jury's
"decision to issue an indictment is made by a deliberative public body acting as an arm of the judiciary
operation under constitutional and other legal constraints" and thus has sufficient "indicia of
reliability").
234. Mallen, 486 U.S. at 240, 244 (holding that grand jury indictment eliminates the right to a pre-
suspension hearing because, in light of the grand jury's action, there is presumed to be "little likelihood
the deprivation is without basis"); see also Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 718 (2003).
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IV. TOWARD AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
So far, the Article has demonstrated that procedural due process is applied
differently in civil and criminal cases and has suggested that this disparity
creates some jarring results. The possibility remains, however, that there are
valid differences between criminal and civil litigation that justify applying due
process differently. Before concluding that procedural due process rules should
reflect an integrated whole, it is important to consider the reasons offered by
the Court to justify adopting distinct civil and criminal due process models. To
do so, it is useful to consider the reasons offered by the Supreme Court in
Gerstein, when it decided that the due process rules developed in its civil
precedents should not govern the criminal pretrial process.
A. Judging the Rationales for Distinguishing Civil and Criminal Due Process
In Gerstein, the Supreme Court offered three related but distinct
justifications for rejecting conventional civil due process rules. First, the Court
suggested that the ex parte procedures embodied in the Fourth Amendment,
rather than the adversary proceedings contemplated by due process, provide all
the process due in pretrial criminal proceedings (a rationale this Article will
refer to as the "displacement" theory).235 Second, the Court reasoned that
minimal adversary protections in the pretrial stages of a criminal case are
sufficient because they are balanced by extensive procedural protections at a
criminal trial (referred to below as the "trial rights" theory). 236 And third, the
Court argued that the criminal process is "wholly different" from civil
proceedings and should primarily reflect historic traditions, rather than a
flexible test for structural fairness developed in the context of agency
adjudication (referred to below as the "criminal process" theory).237 Many of
the same rationales appear in later iterations of the same basic debate, in cases
like Medina and Hamdi, about whether due process rules should be different in
criminal cases.238 Each rationale is considered in turn below.
235. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125 n.27 ("The Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly for the
criminal justice system, and its balance between individual and public interests has always been thought
to define the 'process that is due' for seizures of person or property in criminal cases, including the
detention of suspects pending trial.").
236. See id. ("[T]he Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is in fact only thefirst stage
of an elaborate system, unique in jurisprudence, designed to safeguard the rights of those accused of
criminal conduct.").
237. See id. ("Here we deal with the complex procedures of a criminal case and a threshold right
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. The historical basis of the probable cause requirement is quite
different from the relatively recent application of variable procedural due process in debtor-creditor
disputes and termination of government-created benefits.").
238. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
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1. The "Displacement" Theory of Criminal Due Process
One rationale that underlies the criminal due process model is the idea that
procedural due process requirements should be displaced by other, more
explicit constitutional guarantees. The Court's decision in Gerstein provides a
direct statement of this premise. Because the Fourth Amendment was "tailored
explicitly for the criminal justice system," the Court explained, the
nonadversary proceedings contemplated by that Amendment limit and define
"the process that is due" for pretrial seizures in criminal cases. 9 Under this
rationale, because the Fourth Amendment provides a right to specific
(nonadversary) pretrial procedures in criminal cases, this displaces any claim
that the defendant has a right to (adversary) pretrial procedures under the Due
Process Clause. In subsequent cases, some members of the Court seized on this
aspect of Gerstein to argue for a broad mandate for minimizing criminal due
process rights, primarily in the area of substantive due process.24 °
This reasoning has been justifiably criticized. As an analytical matter, the
fact that a defendant has Fourth Amendment rights with respect to pretrial
criminal procedures fails to explain why other constitutional rights do not
attach. There is no logical reason why a defendant should not enjoy more than
one constitutional right in the same stage of a criminal case. Consider, for
example, a defendant who is arrested on a valid warrant but who has been
selected for prosecution based purely on racial hostility. Even if Fourth
Amendment requirements are satisfied by the judge's issuance of a warrant,
this would not deprive the defendant of an equal pprotection claim based on the
prosecutor's unlawful racial targeting. 24 1 The same logic is true of Fourth
Amendment and due process rights. A defendant could, without any internal
contradiction, possess both a Fourth Amendment right to a judicial
determination of probable cause with respect to his arrest, and a due process
right to an adversary proceeding with respect to cognizable deprivations of his
liberty or property in the course of the criminal case. Simply because a
defendant has a constitutional right to one process in connection with his
239. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125 n.27.
240. These Justices argue that "explicit" constitutional guarantees governing the criminal process
should not be supplemented through the "generalized notion of substantive due process." See Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (stating that because the Fourth Amendment
expressly addresses pretrial deprivations of liberty, substantive due process provides no separate right to
be free from criminal prosecution without probable cause); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)
(Rehnquist, C.J.) (reasoning that because the Fourth Amendment provides an "explicit textual source of
constitutional protection" against unreasonable seizures of the person, that Amendment, rather than
substantive due process, must guide the analysis of excessive force claims during arrest). As Justice
Scalia has expressed this view, substantive due process "cannot be used to impose additional
requirements upon such of the states' criminal processes as are already addressed (and left without such
requirements) by the Bill of Rights." Albright, 510 U.S. at 276 (Scalia, J., concurring).
241. See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (stating that while a prosecutor enjoys
broad charging discretion, the decision of whether to prosecute may not be based on "an unjustifiable
standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification").
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"seizure" does not suggest he should have no constitutional right to additional
process in connection with deprivations of his "liberty" or "property." It seems
logical that some wrongs can "affect more than a single right and, accordingly,
can implicate more than one of the Constitution's commands. 242
What is striking about the Court's willingness to entertain, and indeed rely
on, some variation of a "displacement" theory in Gerstein is that the Court has
easily rejected this rationale in other cases.243 In James Daniel Good Real
Property, for example, the Court had little difficulty rejecting the government's
argument that the Fourth Amendment displaces due process when it held that
adversary procedures must be afforded in the pretrial stages of a civil forfeiture
244
case, even though Fourth Amendment requirements may have been satisfied.
The Court does not generally subscribe to a "displacement" theory of
constitutional criminal procedure. It has suggested in several cases, as in
Gerstein, that due process has "limited operation" in criminal cases beyond the
"specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights." 245 But the Court has in
fact continued to recognize rights implicit in the generalized concept of "due
process of law.",2 4 6 In a criminal trial, for example, the Court has created an
entire body of "free-standing" due process rights, even though a criminal trial is
heavily regulated by specific provisions of the Bill of Rights (indeed, the Sixth
247Amendment is devoted to the criminal trial).
In short, while "explicit" Fourth Amendment rights govern the defendant's
arrest and seizure, this rationale fails to provide a compelling justification for
dispensing with due process protections that would otherwise attach to
cognizable deprivations of liberty and property during the litigation of a
criminal case.
242. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 70 (1992); see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that the "full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided
in the Constitution").
243. See, e.g., Israel, supra note 12, at 405 ("The response of the Gerstein majority, however, has
largely been forgotten.").
244. 510 U.S. 43, 49 (1993) ("We have rejected the view that the applicability of one constitutional
amendment pre-empts the guarantees of another."); see also Albright, 510 U.S. at 286 (Souter, J.,
concurring) ("The Court has previously rejected the proposition that the Constitution's application to a
general subject (like prosecution) is necessarily exhausted by protection under particular textual
guarantees addressing specific events within that subject (like search and seizure), on a theory that one
specific constitutional provision can pre-empt a broad field as against another more general one.").
245. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990); see, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S
437, 443 (1992) ("The Bill of Rights speaks in explicit terms to many aspects of criminal procedure, and
the expansions of those constitutional guarantees under the open-ended rubric of the Due Process Clause
invites undue interference with both considered legislative judgments and the careful balance the
Constitution strikes between liberty and order.").
246. See generally I CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 11, § 2.7(b) (noting the "continuous
growth in due process regulation"); Israel, supra note 12, at 398 ("[Tlhe Court appears to have 'retired'
its description of free-standing due process as having only 'limited operation'.....
247. See supra text accompanying notes 94-103.
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2. The "Trial Rights" Theory of Criminal Due Process
Another justification used by the Supreme Court to rationalize the lack of
preliminary procedural protections in the criminal due process model is the
observation that extensive protections are afforded at the criminal trial itself.
This rationale played a role, for example, in the Gerstein Court's willingness to
dispense with adversary hearing procedures. When a court initially reviews the
government's charges for probable cause, the Court explained, adversary
protections are unnecessary because this is "only the first stage of an elaborate
system, unique in jurisprudence, designed to safeguard the rights of those
accused of criminal conduct."
248
This "trial rights" rationale is related to but distinct from the
"displacement" theory outlined above. The displacement theory, as applied in
Gerstein, posits that there are explicit Fourth Amendment procedures that
govern pretrial criminal procedures, and that these specific procedures should
displace generalized due process hearing requirements that would otherwise
come into play.249 The "trial rights" theory, by contrast, attacks the premise that
interim or temporary deprivations in criminal cases should give rise to separate
due process hearing rights. It posits, in essence, that if sufficient protections are
afforded at the ultimate trial, it should be possible to limit or eliminate
procedural protections in advance of trial. The tendency to view the guilt or
innocence phase of a criminal case as the "real event" in a criminal prosecution
is a theme that runs through the Court's criminal procedure rulings more
generally,2 50 despite its questionable premise.2 5'
It is undeniable that a criminal defendant enjoys extensive protections at a
248. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27 (1975) (emphasis omitted). Professor Israel, for
example, has speculated that the key to the Court's ruling in Lem Woon, holding that a preliminary
hearing is not required by due process, "was that the defendant would receive a fair hearing in the
adjudication of his guilt." See Israel, supra note 12, at 377.
249. See supra Subsection IV.A.I.
250. See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 283 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing
that due process requirements in the pretrial process would not help ensure "fundamental fairness in the
determination of guilt at trial"); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979) ("The ultimate
determination of such claims of innocence is placed in the hands of the judge and jury."); Costello v.
United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956) (stating that at the "trial on the merits, defendants are entitled to
a strict observance of all the rules designed to bring about a fair verdict," and that applying evidentiary
rules to grand jury proceedings would "add nothing to the assurance of a fair trial").
251. The Court has increasingly recognized that pretrial proceedings play an important role in
criminal cases. See, e.g., Ash v. United States, 413 U.S. 300, 310 (1973) ("[E]xtension of the right to
counsel to events before trial has resulted from changing patterns of criminal procedure and
investigation that have tended to generate pretrial events that might appropriately be considered to be
parts of the trial itself."); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) ("[T]oday's law enforcement
machinery involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings
where the results might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.").
Indeed, this has been the premise on which the Court has been willing to extend the Sixth Amendment
right o counsel beyond the trial itself to any proceeding that is a "critical stage" in a criminal
prosecution, which may include such pretrial proceedings as bail hearings, arraignment, and preliminary
hearings. See supra note 123.
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criminal trial. The criminal trial, should it occur, is attended by numerous
procedural rights, collectively understood as part of "due process" (in the
broader systemic sense used by Justice Scalia, rather than the specific
constitutional phrase).252 But any superficial appeal of the "trial rights" theory
of criminal due process is belied by two problems, one practical and one
conceptual. As a practical matter, of course, the premise that any errors in the
pretrial process will be remedied by review at the criminal trial is
counterfactual in view of the simple fact that most criminal cases don't go to
trial.253 Whatever due process protections might otherwise come into play at
trial, these benefits will not be enjoyed by the vast majority of defendants. Nor
could the criminal justice system possibly function if a greater proportion of
defendants insisted on exercising their trial rights. 254 The efficient operation of
criminal justice is heavily dependent on encouraging a large proportion of
defendants to forgo their trial rights and plead guilty. To build due process rules
on the premise that rights in the pretrial process can be minimal because a
criminal defendant will enjoy extensive rights at trial is thus an illusory, and
even pemicious, doctrine.
255
Beyond this practical observation, there is a conceptual flaw with a "trial
rights" justification. It is simply not the case that affording due process rights at
252. See supra text accompanying notes 94-103.
253. See supra note 92.
254. A pithy but apt statement of this principle is found in Professor Lloyd Weinreb's observation
that our system "can offer a trial to all only if few accept the offer." LLOYD WEINREB, DENIAL OF
JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 82 (1977). See, e.g., Arenella, supra note 21, at
468 ("[T]he modem adversarial jury trial is far too expensive, complex and time-consuming to be used
as the system's routine method for dispute resolution."); Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the
American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 408 (1992) ("In the past few decades, criminal
jury trials have become so lengthy and complex that we cannot, or will not, provide them to the vast
majority of defendants.").
255. Professor Peter Arenella, for example, has argued that the minimal protections in the pretrial
process, combined with the high rate of guilty pleas, suggests the need for reforms to the pretrial
process. See Arenella, supra note 21, at 469 ("[lI]t no longer makes sense to rely primarily on the trial to
safeguard essential accusatorial principles when pretrial screening devices like the preliminary hearing
and the grand jury perform the only independent adjudication of the defendant's guilt before conviction
in most cases."). His insightful article focuses on reforms that would improve pretrial procedures to
screen out not only cases in which the defendant is factually innocent (the function served by the current
"probable cause" standard) but also eases in which defendants have valid legal objections would
preclude conviction at trial (the "legally innocent"). Id. at 469-70. Professor Arenella is not so much
concerned with the question of adversary protection in the pretrial process (the focus of the procedural
due process doctrines addressed in this Article) as he is with bringing to the pretrial process
"accusatorial" values such as those expressed in the reasonable doubt standard. In the federal system, he
would be satisfied, for example, with reforms to strengthen the grand jury's ability to make a
preliminary ex parte review, without requiring an adversary proceeding. Id. at 475. Professor Arenella
"assumes" with detailed analysis that the Constitution would require "the preliminary determination of
guilt during the pretrial process [to] provide some protection of the accusatorial values that the trial was
designed to vindicate." Id. at 469. This Article focuses on the distinct constitutional question of the
adversary values inherent in procedural process, and the Court's analysis of procedural due process
principles in the pretrial criminal context and elsewhere. As a result, the conclusions reached in this
Article are quite different from those of Professor Arenella, particularly with respect to the troubling
problem of undue deference to the grand jury's role in the criminal process.
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trial will remedy deprivations that occur before trial. Correcting errors in
pretrial procedures is not a function of the criminal trial. Consider, for example,
a defendant who is improperly detained before trial on baseless charges.256 His
acquittal at trial will neither cure the loss of liberty he has already suffered, nor
provide him with compensation for his wrongful detention.25 7 Acquittal simply
prevents his future imprisonment on the same wrongful charges. It is precisely
because of the risk of such erroneous deprivations-and the difficulty of
remedying such errors after the fact-that the Supreme Court in the civil
context established a default rule that notice and hearing must precede rather
than follow governmental deprivations of liberty or property. 258 There is no
reason to believe that the government is inherently more reliable when it makes
allegations of criminal wrongdoing than, for example, when it seeks the civil
forfeiture of property.
259
In short, the rationale that strong trial protections will balance weak pretrial
protections must also be discounted as a flawed justification for rejecting
ordinary due process protections in the pretrial stages of a criminal case.
256. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1972) ("[O]bviously the disadvantages for
the accused who cannot obtain his [pretrial] release are... serious. The time spent in jail awaiting trial
has a detrimental impact on the individual. It often means loss of a job; it disrupts family life; and it
enforces idleness. Most jails offer little or no recreational or rehabilitative programs. The time spent in
jail is simply dead time. Moreover, if a defendant is locked up, he is hindered in his ability to gather
evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense. Imposing those consequences on anyone
who has not yet been convicted is serious. It is especially unfortunate to impose them on those persons
who are ultimately found to be innocent.").
257. See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 56 (1993) ("[T]he
availability of a postseizure hearing may be no recompense for losses caused by erroneous
seizure .. "); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972) ("[N]o later hearing and no damage award can
undo the fact that the arbitrary taking that was subject to the right of procedural due process has already
occurred."); cf Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) (stating that a citizen arrested and detained in
prison without probable cause to support the charges suffers no compensable due process violation).
258. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 15 (1991) (stating that a post-deprivation hearing
will "not cure the temporary deprivation that an earlier hearing might have prevented"); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 696 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he case for advance procedural safeguards
(such as a magistrate's determination of probable cause) is more compelling when the Government
finally inflicts an injury that cannot be repaired in a subsequent judicial proceeding .... ").
259. See James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 53 (noting that a preseizure hearing in a civil
forfeiture case serves to "minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivation of property"). Chief
Justice Rehnquist argued that the Fuentes line of civil cases is more properly interpreted as a response to
the risks created by "potential bias of the self-interested private party seeking attachment," and that
adversary procedures should not be necessary when the government is seeking a pretrial remedy. James
Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 71 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This
is hard to square, however, with the Court's recognition elsewhere that a government prosecutor, like a
private litigant, acts in the zealous capacity of a party within the criminal process. See, e.g., Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-53 (1971) (stating that a prosecutor's responsibility for law
enforcement is inconsistent with a disinterested role). While government officials are not "self-
interested" in the same way a party might be, this does not mean that they are unbiased, as the Court has
used that term, or that there is no risk that government lawyers may be overzealous in their enforcement
efforts.
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3. The "Criminal Process" Theory of Criminal Due Process
The final justification offered by the Court to rationalize a unique model of
criminal due process is straightforward but simplistic: criminal cases are
different. Returning again to Gerstein, this theme finds clear expression in
explaining the criminal due process model. The historical basis of criminal
prosecution makes criminal cases "quite different from the relatively recent
application of variable due process in debtor-creditor disputes and termination
of government-created benefits. '260 In this view, civil notice-and-hearing
procedures are simply "inapposite and irrelevant" in the "wholly different
context" of the criminal justice system. 26 1 Clearly, the intuitive sense that
criminal cases are just "different" in some due process respect is deeply felt-it
later reappears in the debate, in cases like Medina, over whether the Mathews
test is applicable in criminal cases.262
The question, however, is how criminal procedure is different-what it is
about the criminal process that calls for distinguishing criminal pretrial rules
from normal due process principles. 263 It is true that criminal prosecutions
260. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27 (1975) (adding that the Fourth Amendment's
balance between individual and public interests "has always been thought to define the 'process that is
due' for seizures of person or property in criminal cases").
261. Id; see also, e.g., James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 50 (reasoning that criminal due
process rules differ from those in civil cases because "the arrest or detention of a suspect occurs as part
of the regular criminal process, where other safeguards ordinarily ensure compliance with due process").
262. See supra note 79.
263. In considering this question, I have limited consideration to the Court's express rationales for
its decision in Gerstein flatly distinguishing between criminal and civil cases. It is, of course, also
possible that pragmatic considerations not expressed also influenced the Court. One issue lurking below
the surface, for example, was the contemporaneous debate over criminal discovery rules. In criminal
cases, unlike civil litigation, the entitlement to discover an opposing party's evidence in advance of trial
can be quite limited. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. If adversary pretrial hearings were routinely required
in criminal cases, they would have provided a backdoor avenue of discovery not otherwise available to
the criminal defendant. See, e.g., Sciortino v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 1967)
(acknowledging that in a preliminary hearing "there is necessarily some discovery of the government's
evidence," but that this is not the purpose of the hearing); cf United States v. Contreras, 776 F.2d 51, 55
(2d Cir. 1985) (noting that allowing the defendant to review the government's evidence of probable
cause at a pretrial detention hearing would "serve as a discovery tool" and undermine the "carefully
limited" discovery rules provided in criminal cases). Other practical considerations may have simply
included concerns about the potential cost of imposing additional procedural rights in the criminal
process. See, e.g., Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 122 n.23 ("Criminal justice is already overburdened by the
volume of cases and the complexities of our system."). Professor Carol Steiker has speculated that the
Gerstein majority was motivated by precisely such concerns:
The imposition of yet another expensive and time-consuming protection-the adversary
hearing rejected in Gerstein-would have imposed a cost far beyond the civil due process
hearings that the Court had approved for the repossession of refrigerators and the suspension
of public school students to which Justice Stewart referred in his sharply worded concurrence.
The criminal justice system was simply much bigger and more continuously in operation than
any civil setting, and in addition, it required the free provision of lawyers to participate in any
adversary hearing that might be required. Thus, there were tremendously strong pressures to
decide Gerstein the way it came out in 1975.
Carol S. Steiker, Solving Some Due Process Puzzles: A Response to Jerold Israel, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J.
445,451 (2001).
Yale Law & Policy Review
differ from civil litigation in the extent to which they are regulated by explicit
provisions of the Bill of Rights (many Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment
protections are specific to criminal cases), as well as in the protectiveness of
trial procedures (the reasonable doubt standard and the presumption of
innocence come to mind). But these issues have already been dispatched above
as inadequate justifications for refusing to constitutionally regulate the pretrial
criminal process. There must be some other respect in which criminal cases are
"different" to justify this divergent approach.
The implication of cases like Gerstein is that criminal cases are different
because criminal procedure is grounded in a long historic tradition, unlike
modem civil procedures such as administrative complaints or consumer rights
264litigation. Yet the common law procedures struck down in some of the
Court's civil due process precedents have had equally impressive historic
pedigrees as those in criminal cases. The civil replevin procedures the Court
struck down in Fuentes, for example, had ancient roots in the common law, and
had been used without question for many years.265 To say that criminal
procedure doctrines have historic roots does not adequately distinguish them
from many civil judicial procedures that the Court has analyzed under a
conventional due process approach.
Giving determinative weight to historic practice in assessing due process
protections in the criminal pretrial process would be problematic for several
reasons. To begin with, the historic institution that traditionally dominated the
initiation of criminal proceedings-grand jury indictment-is the very
antithesis of modem due process rules. As a secret, nonadversary body that
issues unreviewable determinations, the grand jury is an institution contrary to
the basic due process premise that "fairness can rarely be obtained by secret,
one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights."266 While grand jury
264. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125 n.27 (noting the "relatively recent application of variable due
process in debtor-creditor disputes and termination of government-created benefits"). This is echoed in
Justice Scalia's Hamdi opinion. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 556 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting that due process requires "those common-law procedures traditionally deemed
necessary").
265. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 78-79 (1972) (noting that the prejudgment replevin
statutes struck down by the Court, authorizing the seizure of property before a final judgment, are
derived from an "ancient possessory action" and descend "from the common-law replevin action of six
centuries ago"); see also, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (invalidating traditional
quasi in rem jurisdiction and observing that "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" can
be violated as much "by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no longer justified as by the adoption
of new procedures that are inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional heritage"); Sniadach
v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969) (holding unconstitutional a long-standing practice of
garnishing wages because "[t]he fact that a procedure would pass muster under a feudal regime does not
mean it gives necessary protection to all property in its modem forms"); I CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra
note 11, § 2.7(b) (noting "the Court's application of the Mathews analysis to aspects of civil process that
also have deep roots in our common law heritage"); Israel, supra note 12, at 361 (discussing criminal
due process cases that have struck down procedural practices sanctioned by "settled usage").
266. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975) ("Secrecy is not congenial to truth-
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indictment may satisfy constitutional requirements as a method of accusation
(which is the focus of the Fifth Amendment's grand jury clause), it scarcely
satisfies such requirements as a method of adjudication (which is the focus of
procedural due process).
267
Equally important, perhaps in recognition of such problems, the Supreme
Court long ago abandoned a purely historic interpretation of due process in
criminal pretrial proceedings when it held that the States are free to dispense
with grand jury indictment and to develop alternative means of protecting the
same "substantial rights.' 26s It is hard to say, in light of this ruling, that history
has been the defining factor in assessing pretrial due process rights in criminal
cases when in Hurtado, the Court expressly disavowed limiting the
requirements of due process in criminal cases based on the vagaries of historic
practice.2 69 If anything, the return to a historic emphasis in some of the Court's
criminal due process cases suggests an attempt to revive some older strands in
the Court's due process case law.
270
The "criminal process" rationale is problematic, in the end, because it treats
criminal litigation as a unique and different type of adjudicatory proceeding,
distinct from all other types of adjudication. This suggests a distinction that is
indefensible in theory and disturbing in practice. Criminal litigation involves
valid public safety concerns generally not presented by civil litigation, and it
may legitimately be designed to implement law enforcement goals specific to
the criminal setting, such as the desire to prevent further crimes and to convict
seeking and self-righteousness gives too slender an assurance of rightness. No better instrument has
been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case
against him and opportunity to meet it." (quoting McGrath, 341 U.S. at 171-72 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring))). While a grand jury indictment is ostensibly simply a criminal accusation, Gerstein allows
an indictment to stand in for a judicial probable-cause determination to support arrest and detention. See
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 117 n.19. When so used, indictment goes beyond a mere accusation and becomes
"decisive of rights," at least in the pretrial context.
267. See Niki Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor: Explaining the Constitutional Function of the
Federal Grand Jury, 94 GEO. L.J. 1265, 1300-09 (2006) (arguing that the grand jury plays an accusatory
role, not an adjudicatory role, in criminal litigation).
268. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884) (noting that due process guarantees "not
particular forms of procedure, but the very substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and property");
f I CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 11, § 2.7(b) ("Hurtado found consistent with due process the
filing of felony charges by information even though the common law traditionally required that such
charges be presented by a grand jury's indictment.").
269. See, e.g., 1 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 11, § 2.7(b) ("In Hurtado v. California, the
Court's first major interpretation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court majority
rejected ... a strict, 'frozen-in-history' reading [of a prior due process precedent]."); Israel, supra note
12, at 346 ("Hurtado is often described as the launching pad for the flexible, evolving concept of due
process that later came to dominate the application of due process in both its procedural and substantive
context.").
270. See Israel, supra note 12, at 387 (describing increased emphases on historic practice as "major
reformulations of due process doctrine as applied to criminal procedure" by the Court in recent decades).
In any event, a true historic approach might well result in the conclusion that a preliminary hearing is
required by due process, given the historic antecedents of this institution. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507, 556 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing common law tradition as "committal by a
magistrate followed by indictment and trial" (emphasis added)).
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those who have committed crimes. From a due process perspective, however,
these are not goals that our system ordinarily pursues at the cost of expediency.
Even in the context of an alleged "enemy combatant" in the War on Terror, due
process rules begin from the premise that procedural protections should be
designed to protect a person who is "erronously detained.,
271
Criminal litigation generally involves greater stakes, it is true, and thus is
accompanied by more extensive procedural protections during the trial
phase.272 But this is a difference of degree, and not of kind. Criminal litigation,
like civil and administrative litigation, are all methods of adjudicating rights
273built on the same basic model of adversary justice. The question remains why
criminal cases are so fundamentally different that criminal (but not civil)
defendants should be subjected to deprivations of liberty and property interests
pending trial, on the strength of an accusation and without an opportunity to
test the factual basis for the charges. This is a question that neither Medina nor
Gerstein convincingly answers.
In short, enforcing a sharp dividing line between civil and criminal due
process rules is untenable because there is not a comparably sharp dividing line
between criminal and civil cases. This is readily demonstrated by the due
process problems presented by cases like Mallen (in which the government
pursued parallel civil and criminal proceedings) 274 and James Daniel Good
Real Property (in which the government brought a civil forfeiture case
275following a criminal prosecution). It is bound to become apparent, in such
cases, when the constitutional hearing rights granted in one setting diverge
sharply from those extended in the other, despite the evident similarity. Unless
the two due process doctrines are integrated, these differences will inevitably
create pressure either to raise the due process standard in criminal cases (as
276Justice Stewart urged), or to lower the due process standard in civil cases (as
271. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 530 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) ("[A]t this stage in the Mathews
calculus, we consider the interest of the erroneously detained individual."); id. (noting that the weight of
Hamdi's significant interest in avoiding detention is "not offset by the circumstances of war or the
accusation of treasonous behavior"); cf Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995) ("The maxim of the
law is... that it is better that ninety-nine ... offenders should escape, than that one innocent man
should be condemned." (citation omitted)).
272. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971) ("[P]rocedures adequate to determine a
welfare claim may not suffice to try a felony charge.").
273. See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (stating that due process in
criminal prosecution requires at a minimum "notice of the charge and an adequate opportunity to be
heard in defense of it"); Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 326 (1915) (stating that due process is
satisfied when a criminal prosecution "includes notice, and a hearing, or an opportunity to be heard,
before a court of competent jurisdiction, according to established modes of procedure").
274. See FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 (1988) (applying due process in proceedings to suspend a
bank president from government employment following his indictment on criminal charges).
275. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 55 (1993) (applying due
process in civil forfeiture proceedings initiated following criminal conviction).
276. See supra text accompanying note 15.
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then-Justice Rehnquist argued).277
In sum, the Supreme Court has failed to provide a compelling justification
for adopting a criminal due process model that rejects any adversary
protections in the pretrial stages of a case. It has failed to explain why
procedural due process could not be applied rationally and sensitively to
require appropriate notice-and-hearing procedures to accompany pretrial
deprivations of liberty or property in a criminal case, just as they do in a civil
case, or an agency adjudication. Some final questions remain. What would
integration of civil and criminal due process look like? How would we go about
applying standard procedural due process rules to the pretrial phase of a
criminal case? The Article turns to these challenging questions below.
B. Integrating the Doctrines of Civil and Criminal Due Process
Sketching out a comprehensive, integrated framework of procedural due
process theory is a daunting task. Without suggesting that the author has the
hubris to undertake such an enterprise, it is possible to venture some
observations about how integrating due process rules might affect the criminal
pretrial process.
Justice Scalia's due process model in Hamdi was a relatively literal historic
model. It treated "due process" as a package of traditional rights associated
with criminal prosecution, which are largely but not entirely spelled out in the
278Bill of Rights.  His model echoed Justice Black's view that there is a strict
due process divide between "civil lawsuits" and "government prosecutions for
crime." Justice Black argued that the very elevation of criminal prosecutions as
deserving of special protections in the Bill of Rights suggests, conversely, that
civil trials should not be "hampered or handicapped by the strict and rigid due
279process rules" the Constitution applies to protect criminal defendants. Justice
277. See supra note 227 and accompanying text; cf Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 275 (1984)
(Rehnquist, J.) (stating that in approving a scheme for civil pretrial detention of juvenile delinquents
dangerous to the community, the law "provides far more predetention protections for juveniles than we
found to be constitutionally required for a probable-cause determination for adults in Gerstein"); Hewitt
v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 476 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.) (using the Gerstein decision as a guide to hold that
due process simply requires an "informal, nonadversary evidentiary review" with respect to the prison's
decision to confine an inmate to administrative segregation during an investigation into misconduct
charges against him).
278. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 556 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Due Process
Clause in effect affirms the right of trial according to the process and proceedings of the common law."
(internal quotations and citation omitted)).
279. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 390 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that due
process rules requiring equal access to the judicial process for indigent criminal defendants should not
be extended to the "quite different field of civil cases"). Like Justice Scalia, Justice Black believed that
"due process" in criminal cases is defined as trial in accordance with the specific package of rights
specified in the Constitution. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 744 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting) ("A due process criminal trial means a trial in a court, with an independent judge lawfully
selected, a jury, a defendant's lawyer if the defendant wants one, a court with power to issue compulsory
process for witnesses, and with all the other guarantees provided by the Constitution and valid laws
Yale Law & Policy Review
O'Connor, on the other hand, rejected the idea that there is any special model
of due process in criminal cases. She argued that the same flexible notice-and-
hearing balancing test (embodied in Mathews) provides a general framework
for deciding all procedural due process challenges, whatever the legal
context.
280
There is, on the face of it, a large analytic "gap" between the civil and
criminal due process doctrines advanced in Hamdi. One doctrine defines
procedural due process as a pure balancing test with no reference to tradition,
281
while the other defines procedural due process entirely in terms of traditional
common law procedures. 282 One doctrine posits that the same due process test
applies whatever the setting, while the other posits that due process rules in
criminal cases are distinct and different. Perhaps most disturbing, however, is
the odd distance between their positions on what procedural due process
actually requires. This Article has focused thus far on the criminal model's
unique approach to pretrial procedure, which trades off minimal protections
before trial for extensive procedural protections at the trial itself. But Hamdi
itself actually concerned the opposite side of the equation-the flexible civil
due process model. Hamdi may have the unquestioned right to notice and a
hearing under civil due process rules, but in Justice O'Connor's view at least,
that hearing may be conducted before a military tribunal based on hearsay, with
a presumption that the government is correct.
283
A cursory administrative hearing within a hostile executive branch agency
obviously falls far short of the due process protections that Hamdi would be
afforded in a full-fledged criminal trial before a federal judge with life
tenure.284 There is, by comparison, much less distance between the harms
Hamdi may suffer in each case. If successfully convicted of treason at a
passed pursuant to it.").
280. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (noting that Mathews dictates the
"process due in any given instance" when the government deprives a person of protected interests); ef,
e.g., Bums v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 148 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting) (observing that the
Mathews analysis has "been used as a general approach for determining the procedures required by due
process whenever erroneous governmental action would infringe an individual's protected interest");
Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584, 599 (1979) (stating that Mathews provides "a general approach for testing
challenged state procedures under a due process claim").
281. On its face, the Mathews test does not suggest any consideration of traditional procedural
protections. See supra note 47 (reciting the three-part Mathews test).
282. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 556 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that due process in criminal cases
consists of "those common-law procedures traditionally deemed necessary before depriving a person of
life, liberty or property").
283. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (explaining that "the
Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the Government's evidence"); id. at
538 (suggesting that the hearing could be held before an appropriately constituted military tribunal); id.
at 533-34 (emphasizing that "[h]earsay ... may need to be accepted").
284. See supra note 93 (discussing the odd juxtaposition in enemy combatant cases, in which
enemy combatants seek to be criminally prosecuted, and government prosecutors seek to proceed
civilly).
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criminal trial, Hamdi would likely suffer lengthy detention in a federal prison,
285
or even death. But if successfully classified as an "enemy combatant" at an
administrative hearing, Hamdi will likely suffer indefinite detention in a
military prison.286 While these "sentences" are not identical in length or
purpose, to the extent they both result in his physical detention, they may be
287quite similar from Hamdi's perspective. Given the logical similarity of the
interests at stake, it is hard to understand how the degree of "process" required
could diverge to such a degree based simply on whether the case is viewed as
civil or criminal. As this reflects, the Supreme Court's divergent due process
rules create problems not only on the criminal side, but also on the civil side of
the equation.
Integrating civil and criminal due process doctrines may be possible,
however, by considering what both due process approaches epitomized in
Hamdi are missing. First, both approaches mask the overarching principle that
guides the application of procedural due process, whether in a criminal or civil
setting. The core meaning of procedural due process is clear: when protected
interests are affected, due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity
to be heard. While this principle has come to be applied in a wide variety of
modem settings, it is not a new doctrine. 288 It reflects a noncontroversial
285. See 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2000) (authorizing the death penalty or a prison sentence of not less
than five years as the punishment for treason).
286. Justice O'Connor acknowledged the "substantial prospect of perpetual detention" for the rest
of Hamdi's life if the "war on terror" is broadly construed, Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520 (O'Connor, J.,
plurality opinion), though she sought to limit his detention by suggesting that Hamdi can only be held so
long as American troops are engaged in active combat in Afghanistan, id. at 521.
287. Justice Marshall objected, on precisely this pragmatic ground, to the Court's attempt to
distinguish between permissible regulatory detention and impermissible punitive detention in a case
raising a substantive due process challenge to conditions of pretrial detention. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 569 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[I]n terms of the nature of the imposition and the
impact on detainees, pretrial incarceration ... is essentially indistinguishable from punishment."). He
argued that characterizing different types of detention as punitive or regulatory is an "empty semantic
exercise" when the conditions of detention are virtually the same. Id. at 569 n.7.
288. See, e.g., Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) ("The fundamental requisite of due
process of law is the opportunity to be heard."); Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 436 (1901) ("The
essential elements of due process of law are notice and opportunity to defend. In determining whether
such rights were denied we are governed by the substance of things, and not by mere form."); Louisville
& Nashville R.R. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1900) (explaining that due process is satisfied when
"the person condemned has had sufficient notice and adequate opportunity has been afforded him to
defend"); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 417 (1897) (stating that "due process of law signifies a right to
be heard in one's defence"); Iowa Cent. Ry. v. Iowa, 160 U.S. 389, 393 (1896) (emphasizing that due
process requires that the method of procedure adopted "gives reasonable notice, and affords fair
opportunity to be heard before the issues are decided"); Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277 (1876)
("Wherever one is assailed in his person or his property, there he may defend .... ); Baldwin v. Hale,
68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863) ("Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and
in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified. Common justice requires that no man
shall be condemned in his person or property without notice and an opportunity to make his defence."
(citations omitted)); Nations v. Johnson, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 195, 203 (1860) (stating the common
principle that "no man shall be condemned in his person or property without notice, and an opportunity
to make his defence"); Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. (How. 9) 336, 350 (1850) ("No principle is
more vital to the administration of justice, than that no man shall be condemned in his person or
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constitutional premise that underlies both the Mathews decision 289 and older
due process decisions.
290
Second, and equally important, inherent in the notion that the hearing must
be meaningful is the idea that the contours of the hearing should be
"appropriate to the nature of the case"-an implicit principle of constitutional
proportionality. 29 1  This suggests that the degree of process that is
constitutionally "due" should bear some consistent relationship across criminal
and civil lines. This does not mean that every detention must be preceded by a
full criminal trial.292 It would make little sense to import the entire, highly
developed apparatus of criminal procedure into every setting in which a
deprivation of liberty is at stake. 293 There is, and properly should be, a
distinction between a "criminal prosecution," in which certain explicit rights
granted by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments attach, and something that is not a
criminal prosecution. 294 In noncriminal settings (as in pretrial criminal
settings), depending on the issues at stake, due process may or may not require
the same panoply of rights explicitly granted in criminal trials. 29 5 But there
should be some informed calculation about the types of procedural protections
property without notice, and an opportunity to make his defence.").
289. The Mathews Court, for example, began its analysis with the oft-quoted expression by Justice
Frankfurter that the "right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind... is
a principle basic to our society." See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Joint
Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
290. See, e.g., Hovey, 167 U.S. at 417 (interpreting Justice Story's Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States to mean that "due process of law signifies a right to be heard in one's
defense").
291. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) ("Many
controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can
be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication
be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.").
292. See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 n.9 (1977) ("The fact that due process applies
does not, of course, implicate the entire panoply of criminal trial procedural rights.").
293. Leaving aside the limited applicability of many Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, there are
explicit constitutional rights that are not today considered essential elements of due process-a prime
example being the Fifth Amendment right to grand jury indictment. See Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 62-63 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (rejecting the suggestion that it would be
"inconsistent with a truly free society" to allow prosecutions without an indictment, or to try petty civil
cases without the paraphernalia of a common law jury). Justice Scalia himself has acknowledged that his
interpretation of due process "does not say that every practice sanctioned by history is constitutional."
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 38 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
294. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) ("Prison disciplinary proceedings are not
part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does
not apply.").
295. Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970) (extending the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses to fact-finding processes in welfare benefits termination proceedings), and
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959) (explaining that the same rights of confrontation and
cross-examination that "find expression in the Sixth Amendment" may be applicable not only in
criminal cases but also in administrative settings), with Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 567 (1974)
(emphasizing, in a prison discipline case, that the rights of confrontation and cross-examination are not
rights universally applicable to all hearings).
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the courts have found important in comparable settings.
296
It may be difficult, once one leaves the narrow confines of traditional
judicial procedures, to determine the specific process appropriate to implement
the mandate of procedural due process, but this does not render procedural due
process either permanently fixed or infinitely malleable. Procedural due process
simply cannot be as determinate and rigid as Justice Scalia's historic model
suggests, if it is to be a living constitutional doctrine.297 On the other hand,
neither can due process be as fluid and flexible as Justice O'Connor's narrow
focus on "balancing" the stakes in individual cases tends to suggest, at least not
without creating glaring procedural disparities.
Both approaches would benefit from the simple recognition that implicit in
the notice-and-hearing model of procedural due process that underlies both
doctrines must be some sense of constitutional proportionality across different
types of adjudication. What is "appropriate" simply cannot be determined in a
vacuum that ignores comparable types of litigation. Detaining an individual,
whether in a criminal or civil setting, should require a greater degree of process
than freezing property rights, even if civil detention does not require the full
process of a criminal trial.298
This Article suggests a simple middle ground to understanding and
applying procedural due process. First of all, cognizable deprivations should
generally be preceded by a notice and hearing process. Adversary protections
should extend when government actions threaten the deprivation of protected
liberty or property interests, whether the setting is a criminal or a civil case.
Second, and equally important, comparable deprivations should generally
require a comparable degree of process. Without a compelling rationale to
explain the difference, for example, there should not exist a wide gap between
the due process procedures that govern a criminal pretrial detention proceeding
296. See, e.g., McNeil v. Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245, 249 (1972) (emphasizing that when a civil
commitment is "permanent in its practical effect, it require[s] safeguards commensurate with a long-
term commitment"); Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 177 (1951) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (stating that if notice is required for "even the most minor claim asserted against a
defendant" in civil cases, the court should require no less when it comes to an administrative
determination that "may well destroy the group" that is so labeled); Friendly, supra note 8, at 1298
(suggesting that while it may be impossible to apply a "universal scale of seriousness" to reconcile the
body of procedural due process rulings, at the same time, the cases suggest "gradations" in the gravity of
the interests at stake).
297. No less eminent a jurist than Justice Frankfurter suggested, for example, that while some of
the express rights granted in the first eight Amendments "are enduring reflections of experience with
human nature," others are better viewed as the "restricted views of Eighteenth-Century England
regarding the best methods for the ascertainment of facts." Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63
(1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414-15 (1945)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (same). It cannot be that all of those rights are part of a "frozen" conception
of procedural due process. See generally Redish & Marshall, supra note 3, at 469 (emphasizing that the
Supreme Court's "frozen-in-history" approach to procedural due process "did not last long").
298. See supra notes 228-230 and accompanying text (discussing the divergence between the
protections afforded to civil property seizures under Fuentes and those extended to pretrial detention in
criminal cases under Gerstein).
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and those that govern a civil pretrial detention proceeding, if the duration and
conditions of confinement will be comparable. 299 The mere label of "criminal"
or "civil" should not be determinative of due process rights that attach when the
individual is threatened with virtually the same harm in either instance. 300
Having derived at least a basic framework for an "integrated" due process
model,3 ° 1 it is useful to return to our original focus: how procedural due process
should operate in pretrial criminal settings under the insights derived above. To
begin with, it is important to be clear on what would not change. Integrating
due process rules would not require transforming the grand jury into an
adversary process. 302 Due process comes into play in proceedings that
adjudicate rights, not in proceedings that merely investigate or accuse. 303 Under
normal due process principles, a party can develop its charges without
implicating due process notice-and-hearing requirements, and the criminal
process should be no different.30 4 The grand jury's accusation need not be an
adversary process.30 5 Applying conventional due process hearing principles is
not a backdoor way to get the "camel's nose" under the tent of grand jury
proceedings.
What would change, however, is that the mere fact of grand jury indictment
could not be used to justify issuing orders restricting the defendant's liberty or
property rights pending trial, or to foreclose the court from considering, at a
pretrial hearing, whether the government's charges are supported by the
evidence. 306 Instead, under an integrated due process approach, to support the
299. See supra notes 219-222 and accompanying text (discussing the divergence between the due
process approaches to pretrial detention in Gerstein and Morrissey).
300. Cf In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967) (noting that whether juvenile commitment is deemed
civil or criminal, it is "incarceration against one's will" and a deprivation of one's liberty).
301. The question remains, of course, whether the Mathews three-part balancing test should or
should not be the general test for procedural due process. While full discussion of this question is
beyond its scope, this Article simply suggests that the debate may be fruitfully redirected by considering
those aspects of procedural due process underlying Mathews that are not controversial: the core principle
that hearings should precede governmental deprivations and the implicit premise that hearing procedures
should be proportional.
302. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 264-65 (1948) ("Grand juries investigate .... They do
not try and they do not convict. They render no judgment.").
303. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960) (holding that an administrative agency
charged with investigating rather than adjudicating need not provide notice-and-hearing rights, on the
grounds that "since the [agency] does not adjudicate, it need not be bound by adjudicatory procedures").
304. Nor would defendants have adversary rights in connection with the issuance of arrest or search
warrants. Due process rules, quite sensibly, recognize an exception for "exigent circumstances" when
providing prior notice would threaten the integrity of the judicial process, or cause a party to flee or
destroy evidence. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94 n.30 (1972) (noting that due process does not
require "an adversary hearing before a search warrant is issued"); see also supra note 61 and
accompanying text.
305. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 265 (1948) (holding that the grand jury is constitutionally
permitted to work in secrecy because an indictment "cannot be used as evidence against the person
indicted," nor may the defendant "be fined or sentenced to jail until he has been tried and convicted after
having been afforded the procedural safeguards required by due process of law").
306. See supra Subsection l1.B.2 (discussing legally preclusive effect of grand jury indictment in
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defendant's pretrial imprisonment, or his suspension from government
employment, or restrictions on his right to travel or work, or seizure of his
assets, there should be an adversary hearing appropriate to the circumstances,
and the contours of that hearing should at least roughly approximate what
would be constitutionally required for an analogous proceeding in a civil case.
When exigent circumstances are not present (for example, when the defendant
is already in custody), such adversary procedures should precede, rather than
follow, the deprivation at issue. The grand jury's doors need not be opened to
the defendant, but neither should the grand jury's one-sided accusatory process
substitute for adversary procedures normally required as a constitutional matter
to deprive the defendant of his liberty or property.
307
In essence, an integrated approach would recognize that as a matter of due
process, at least when the government seeks some restriction on the defendant's
rights during a criminal prosecution, the defendant should have a constitutional
right to some appropriate preliminary hearing (not merely a provisional
308
statutory entitlement to a preliminary hearing, as under existing law). In such
a hearing, the proper focus should be on allowing the defendant to see and
challenge the government's evidence to show a factual basis for its allegations
of criminal wrongdoing. 30 9 An integrated, rational theory of due process would
not be satisfied by providing an adversary pretrial hearing but insisting that
grand jury indictment conclusively establishes probable cause for the criminal
charges (as in Salerno).3 1 0 Nor would it be satisfied by providing for
independent judicial review of the government's evidence but excluding the
defendant from participation in that process (as in Gerstein).31 1 On the other
hand, the provisional and interim nature of the process would suggest that due
process should permit some level of proof that simply demands reasonable,
rather than absolute, certainty about whether the facts will ultimately be proved
as the government asserts-just as the standard at a pretrial civil hearing may
pretrial process).
307. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 265 (reasoning that when a grand jury conducts a contempt
proceeding, it must be measured "not by the limitations applicable to grand jury proceedings, but by the
constitutional standards applicable to court proceedings in which an accused may be sentenced to fine or
imprisonment or both").
308. See supra notes 194-200 and accompanying text (discussing the problems created by the
statutory nature of the defendant's entitlement to a preliminary hearing).
309. In a civil case, for example, it would not suffice to provide a hearing to consider whether
granting preliminary injunctive relief would harm the defendant, but to exclude from consideration the
central question whether the plaintiff was likely to prevail at the ultimate trial. See, e.g., New Comm
Wireless Servs., Inc. v. SprintCom, Inc., 287 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002) ("The sine qua non of this four-
part inquiry [for granting a preliminary injunction] is likelihood of success on the merits."); cf Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1971) (emphasizing that "[iut is a proposition which hardly seems to need
explication that a hearing which excludes consideration of an element essential to the decision" does not
meet the standard of a meaningful hearing required by due process).
310. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
311. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
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be lower than the standard that will apply at trial.312
This integrated due process approach would affect the federal system the
most because it relies so heavily on grand jury indictments in lieu of
meaningful adversary hearings.3 13 Under current rules, for example, the
government can obtain an indicted defendant's detention from now until the
end of his criminal trial without making an evidentiary showing to the court to
support the validity of the government's charges. 314 Under an integrated due
process approach, preliminary hearings-or proceedings akin to them-would
be required in many more federal cases than at present. On the state level, an
integrated approach would have a less significant impact because preliminary
hearings are already routinely used.315 It could, however, potentially open up to
constitutional scrutiny the sufficiency of particular procedures used at such
hearings.
3 16
In sum, criminal pretrial proceedings need not be as extensive as a criminal
trial, nor must they follow the same evidentiary rules. What such procedures
should do, however, is grant the right to meaningful testing of the basis for the
government's criminal charges, to minimize the risk of mistaken or baseless
deprivations. The current constitutional framework fails even this limited test.
CONCLUSION
The complex body of Supreme Court rulings with respect to pretrial
criminal procedures, spanning over a century, tell a curious history. It is not
readily apparent, for example, why the Court so curtly abandoned the due
process premise expressed in Hurtado-which stated that the essence of due
process is meaningful review of the basis for criminal charges, whatever the
form of that review 317-in favor of its flat premise in Lem Woon that there is no
312. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485-89 (stating that in a preliminary civil
detention hearing, the court simply inquires "whether there is probable cause or reasonable ground" to
believe the government will prevail).
313. See supra note 134 (discussing the small proportion of federal criminal defendants who
receive preliminary hearings).
314. The existence of probable cause to support the government's charges is presumed from the
grand jury's indictment. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 117 n.19.
315. See supra note 181.
316. As noted earlier, Professor Arenella has argued that a "probable cause" standard is unduly
permissive and that pretrial screening of criminal charges should be conducted under some standard that
relates to the accusatorial burdens that will be placed on the government at trial. See Arenella, supra
note 21, at 469-70 (arguing that pretrial criminal procedures should screen not only for factual innocence
but also for "legal innocence"). The current "probable cause" standard generally used in preliminary
hearings is a minimal threshold that simply screens for evidence of guilt, not likelihood of success at
trial.
317. See 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (holding that due process is satisfied because providing a
preliminary hearing in lieu of grand jury review "carefully considers and guards the substantial interest
of the prisoner").
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due process right to preliminary review of the basis for criminal charges. 318 Nor
is it clear why the Court, during the very time it was recognizing the modem
implications of the notice-and-hearing model for both administrative and civil
litigation, should have drawn such a clear line in Gerstein precluding
adversarial rights in the pretrial criminal process. 319 These are curious rulings
that lead to highly anomalous results in terms of perceived and actual inequities
in the processing of criminal cases.
This Article has argued that the Court's decisions create a problematic
distinction between a civil model of due process, as advocated by Justice
O'Connor, and a criminal model of due process, as advocated by Justice Scalia.
It has suggested that the explanations advanced by the Court to justify different
treatment of procedural due process in civil and criminal cases fail to provide a
convincing rationale. To escape this analytical conundrum, this Article
proposes a simple doctrinal premise: when governmental actions threaten
individual interests to a comparable degree, this should raise comparable
concems about accuracy, and should thus require a comparable degree of
process. Tradition should not be enough to insulate procedural practices that
deprive a criminal defendant of rights deemed substantial in comparable civil
settings. 32  As Justice Stewart aptly observed, if a refrigerator cannot
constitutionally be seized without meaningful adversary procedures, then
meaningful procedures should also be required to detain a human being.321
318. See 229 U.S. 586, 590 (1913) (stating that the Court is "unable to see upon what theory" due
process should require a preliminary hearing).
319. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
320. To use a phrase attributed to de Toqueville, particularly favored by Justice Frankfurter, to
suggest that a criminal procedure is traditional and thus equivalent to the fair hearing guaranteed by due
process is to "confound the familiar with the necessary." Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
321. See supra text accompanying note 15.

